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 This study focused on married women’s negotiation of gender roles 
and social positionings during Singapore’s nation building era 
(1960s-2000). Using decolonial approaches to centre ordinary and 
mundane everyday activities as sources of knowledge, this study 
aimed to create knowledge on Singapore gender relations and the 
long-term impact on Singaporean women. The research questions 
are: (1) What were the context and factors in Singapore that 
marginalised young Singaporean women the 1970s-80s? (2) How 
did Singaporean women negotiate their roles as mothers and wives, 
and what were the consequences faced at middle-aged? and (3) In 
what ways did Singaporean women resist subjugation?  
 
 Semi-structured interviews were conducted using videoconferencing 
with seven married women, aged between 55 and 60 and have 
children. This study found that natal family’s lack of financial 
resources, women’s lack of English proficiency and institutional 
gender discrimination restricted some Singaporean women’s access 
to higher education in the 1970s-80s. Singaporean motherhood was 
heavily shaped by the idea of meritocratic pursuit of material 
success, wherby mothers hoped for children to gain upwards social 
mobility. Furthermore, working women’s negotiation of domestic 
duties were class-differentiated, and financial independence of 
homemakers diminished over time. Singaporean wives also tended 
to be subjugated within spousal units as a result of ‘Asian values’ 
discourse, maintaining husbands as ‘heads of household’. As a 
result, women tended to feel isolated and frustrated at middle-aged. 
However, female-dominated domains such as care work and 
motherhood allowed Singaporean women to form generative 
relationships that emancipated them. While resigning to their reality 
of subjugation, Singaporean women also resist by rescripting gender 
roles for the next generation, socialising their children with different 
sets of gender roles. Understanding Singaporean women’s 
subjugation and resistance could provide opportunities for future 




Singapore, decolonial feminism, middle-aged women, gender roles, 
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“Your mother never teach you ah?”, a colloquial slang used to jeer at someone after they 
have done something foolish, ill-mannered or socially frowned upon. It is used with close 
contacts as a rude and crass joke, but may be harsh and offensive to others. It carries 
the notion of someone having poor-upbringing. Besides attacking the person-in-question 
directly, it also blames their mother for doing a poor job of parenting. This slang carries 
the underlying notion that mothers are normative persons to raise children, responsible 
for their actions even when they grow up. It reflects my interviewee, Madeline’s quote, 
“People will always judge whether a child is well-behaved and criticise if the mother 
knows how to raise the child, never the father.” 
 
My study situates Singaporean women, born around the time when Singapore becoming 
independent, at the centre of knowledge production. A former British colony since 1819, 
Singapore was self-governed from 1959, merged with Malaysia in 1963 and gained 
independence in 1965. Singapore is a unique settler nation because the majority 
population is ethnic Chinese colonised migrants/subjects instead of white colonial 
settlers (Chua, 2008). Chinese migration to Malaya and Singapore was known to have 
taken place as early as the 10th century, before European colonial and missionary 
migration presence in the 15th century (Teoh, 2014).  
 
When Singapore gained independence, the need for the country to thrive in global 
capitalism is argued to be necessary for the ruling party to govern Singapore in times of 
unstable electoral democracy, following regional anticolonial movements in the 1940s-
50s (Chua, 2017). The anticolonial struggles in South East Asia (SEA) was essentially a 
civil war which saw armed conflicts between colonial regimes and communists in 
colonised lands, happened concurrently with the Cold war in Soviet Union and the 
establishment of People’s republic of China in the 1940s (Chua, 2008; Wade, 2009; 
Hansson et al., 2020).  
 
Singapore begun experiencing rapid industrialisation with increased investments from 
foreign capital by mid-1960s (Chua, 2008). The country rapidly became the regional hub 
for export and management of various productions by 1970s, partly from industries 
developed by the United States Cold war planners through offshore procurements during 
the Korean War (Hansson et al., 2020). After decades of sustained economic growth 
through capitalistic industrialisation that lifted many out of poverty, Singapore is now an 
island-state made up of a large population of educated, homeowning and globally 
 5 
connected middle-class, a country known as a ‘model’ of development, amplifying the 
small island-nation’s voice in global economy and politics that is disproportionate to its 
size (Chua, 2017; Ang & Stratton, 2018). To sustain Singapore’s position in global 
capitalism, the country continued to adopt and accept consequences of capitalistic 
values such as meritocracy that promotes individualistic competition and self-reliance in 
education and employment (Chua, 2017). 
 
I will focus on time period beginning from Singapore’s rapid industrialisation in the 1960s 
to the nation’s more robust economy in the 2000s.  As such, I named this period 
‘establishing Singapore’ and would use it throughout my thesis. I chose the word, 
‘establishing’ instead of ‘emerging’ because Singapore had long existed before 
independence and being colonised (Miksic, 2017; Chong, 2020). Furthermore, 
contemporary Singapore was already in ‘completely modernist terms’ when it gained 
independence (Chua, 2008, p 10). Singapore did not have equivalent movements such 
as women suffrage in Europe and the United States. Women were allowed to vote since 
the first general election in 1948 when Singapore moved towards self-governance 
(Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE), 2015). ‘Establishing’ is also 
a verb that implies action, indicating that there are people in power positions determining 
the process of establishment, helpful in interrogating layers of power. Moreover, 
‘establishing’ carries the connotation of gaining recognition in the global landscape, 
especially global economy, something important to a small city-state. Now that 
Singapore is considered established (Chua, 2017), a retrospective study on the period 
of establishing is timely and can contribute to Singapore’s history writing.  
 
Using existing literature written on independent Singapore and feminist decoloniality, I 
posit that the lived experiences of women interviewed were so ‘ordinary’ and unassuming 
that have been overlooked in understanding the history of establishing Singapore. There 
were little literature1 that centred on their narratives of everyday lives in the 1960s-2000s. 
Literature about Singaporean women at that time period predominantly analysed ways 
in which patriarchal state policies shaped gender discourses to maintain hegemonic 
family units and drive the country’s capitalistic economy2. In most of those literature, 
voices of the subject were not emphasized, and this study aims to fill this gap. I propose 
that the life trajectories and intimacies of women who grew up during Singapore’s 
industrialisation could provide an alternative standpoint to understand the social 
conditions in Singapore at that time. Hence, my study retrieved and centred knowledge 
                                                 
1 For example, Ho, 2015 
2 For example, Heng & Devan, 1995; Pyle, 1997; PuruShotam, 1998; Wong & Yeoh, 2003; Kho, 2004; 
Teo, 2007; Teo, 2009; Chan 2020. 
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from these women’s retrospective negotiation of roles to establish Singapore. I suggest 
that their retrospection could contribute to existing knowledge on state policies’ 
implications on women in Singapore. 
 
Feminist decolonial practices carry potentials of scripting alternative historical narratives 
that show the process of subjugation throughout the sustained economic growth of 
Singapore. I adopted Walter Mignolo and Catherine Walsh’s (2018:p. 5) interpretation of 
decoloniality as ‘a way, option, standpoint, analytic, project, practice and praxis.’ Their 
argument is based on Anibal Quijano’s (2000) definition of ‘coloniality of power’. This 
concept sees global capitalism as patterns of power, maintained by the hierarchy of race, 
whereby labour relations is presided by historical exploitations (Quijano, 2000). 
Coloniality includes the process of active reduction and dehumanisation of people that 
reduced and subjugated them to fit classification in order to colonise them as lesser 
beings (Lugones, 2010). Quijano’s (2000) definition can be adopted in the context of 
Singapore as the country plays a significant role in global capitalism and has used 
‘multiculturalism’ as a tool for social control (Chua, 2003; Chua,2017).  
 
This research is my practice of feminist decoloniality. To explore coloniality in Singapore, 
I used Gustavo Esteva’s and Madhu Suri Prakash’s (1998; 2014) concept of one-
third/two-third world to understand how social conditions aimed at maintaining race 
hierarchy and driving the Singapore economy intensified or mitigated the reduction of 
Singaporean women to lesser being. I also combine Chandra Mohanty’s (1991) ‘third 
world women’ and Meyda Yeğenoğlu’s (1998) definition of a ‘western subject’ to 
understand Singaporean women as a diverse group and the fluidity of their social 
position. My research questions are: 
1. What were the context and factors in Singapore that marginalised young 
Singaporean women the 1970s-80s? 
2. How did Singaporean women negotiate their roles as mothers and wives, and 
what were the consequences faced at middle-aged? 
3. In what ways did Singaporean women resist subjugation? 
 
I interviewed seven married Singaporean women, born between 1961 and 1970 whose 
children were adults, over videoconferencing. Aimed at answering my research 
questions, I asked them retrospective questions surrounding their aspirations when they 
were young adults, how did they manage their roles in domestic and working spheres, 
their sense of autonomy in being able to make decisions for their families and themselves, 
and how they felt towards domestic and work arrangements made in their early 
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adulthood? Retrospective questions could provide nuanced understanding to the context 
that interviewees were in at different life stages, carrying potential to rewrite history from 
their standpoints. 
 
Additionally, I asked interviewees about their present opinions towards their overall life 
satisfaction, womanhood in their mothers’ and daughters’ generation, and what advices 
would they give to their younger selves and children. Finally, I asked them questions 
about their hope for the future, such as what ‘aging with dignity’ meant to them. 
Questions on interviewees’ present informs us in what ways has the past impacted them, 
which could provide lesson to inform future feminist actions. Interviewees’ hope for future 
could provide understanding on the long-term impacts of gender roles performance in 
their young adulthood, carrying potentials to explore ways that may better support them 
at old age.  
 
On top of Introduction and Conclusion, this thesis consists of five other chapters –
Methodology & Methods, Literature Review, and three chapters on Findings & 
Discussions. In the Methodology and Methods chapter, I discussed the use of technology 
to conduct intergenerational interview and intergenerational dynamics of researcher-
interviewee relationship, including a detailed description of my data collection process. 
My literature review analysed decolonial feminist approaches and theories to situate 
Singaporean women’s roles in Singapore’s national development. In addition, I reviewed 
literature on the construction of women’s roles in Singapore and how gender is used to 
establishing race and citizenship in Singapore.  
 
In the first Findings & Discussions chapter, I discussed three main factors that restricted 
Singaporean women from accessing higher education and better jobs in their young 
adulthood. Lower social economic status of interviewees’ natal family, not being 
proficient in English and facing gender discrimination in more resource-intensive sectors 
prevented interviewees from participating in Singapore’s labour force that provided 
higher material returns, limiting some of them to low-wage work. I analysed how those 
barriers could change women’s social position for better or worse. Their social 
positioning was analysed using Esteva’s and Prakash’s (1998; 2014) one-third/two-third 
concept to illustrate the fluidity and precarity of their social positions as a result of those 
barriers, showing that the lived experience of ‘Singaporean women’ is not singular. 
 
The second findings & discussion chapter presented how interviewees negotiated their 
domestic roles – as mothers and wives – and paid work in relations to the government’s 
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stance of Singaporean women’s role in society. I presented the class-differentiated 
conditions that pushed or disallowed interviewees to become homemakers, and how 
Singaporean motherhood was grounded on the meritocratic ideals of children having 
social mobility. Not participating in the labour force resulted in them losing financial 
independence which brought them anxiety towards aging and unable to perform kinship 
duties as ‘daughters’. Spousal hierarchy and the concept of ‘head of household’ was 
discussed in interviewees’ negotiation of their roles as wives. Playing a subordinated role 
to one’s husband was grounded on ‘Asian Values’ perpetuated by the state’s strategy to 
maintain social order (Zakaria & Lee, 1994). Hence, some interviewees’ individual needs 
were downplayed, lacking emotional support from their husbands. Nevertheless, some 
interviewees also had supportive and mutual relationships with their husbands. 
 
The final chapter explored areas and ways which interviewees found emancipation and 
practiced resistive acts against subjugation. Interviewees’ relationships with children, 
rarely found in other kin relationships, were generative. Furthermore, interviewees 
demonstrated autonomy in the ways and aims they carried out labour within female-
dominated sites of care. They formed webs of knowledge with similar women and 
prioritised children as a full being; instead of, producing potential units of manpower to 
drive Singapore’s future economy. Interviewees’ participation in this study by talking to 
me and their relationship with their children were unintentional act of resistance that 
transcended generations. I analysed their resistance using Maria Lugones’s (2005) 








Collecting data during the Covid-19 pandemic presented challenges and opportunities 
to experiment with creative methods. I adopted Chazan’s and Macnab’s (2018) concept 
of feminist intergenerational mic to interview seven women using videoconferencing 
service, Zoom. The feminist intergenerational mic utilised technology as part of data 
collection process to create conditions that disrupted conventional data collection 
procedure and researcher-participant dynamics. This methodology challenged (1) 
researcher-participant relationship and power dynamics whereby researchers build 
relationships with participants, and (2) intergenerational relationship of elders as wisdom 
donors by building multidirectional and reciprocal relationship. The practice of feminist 
intergenerational mic also disrupted ageist stereotypes such as elderly being 
technologically illiterate.  
 
This methodology challenged the researcher-participant power dynamic and relationship 
through the conditions needed to operate data collection. For example, contrary to 
conventional interviews where researcher set aside a fixed time to collect data from 
participants, this methodology provides room for time to be negotiated. Like Chazan and 
Macnab’s (2018) workshop that has a ‘tech training’ session, some participants and I 
had rehearsal zoom sessions.  It allowed interviewees to test out the application by 
accessing the Zoom discussion room independently and navigating the functions (i.e. 
entering room, turning video on/off, mute/unmute). Prior to the rehearsal, I sent out step-
by-step information on how to download the app and made myself available if 
interviewees needed support.  
 
Due to the prevalence of videoconferencing as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, all 
interviewees were familiar with the idea of using Zoom. While some expressed not 
knowing how to use it or had some issues when using it, I affirmed them that we would 
navigate it together, and they can use this interview as a safe space to experiment with 
the digital tool. Interviewees who were still working in jobs that provided them with a 
laptop tended to use a computer for the interview, and were already familiar with using 
videoconferencing tools. Those who were currently not working tended to use their 
mobile phones and were using Zoom for the first time. Many sought supports from their 
daughters, especially for downloading and using it the first time. 
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During rehearsal interviews, interviewees were able to take the chance to ask me about 
myself and my research motivation, building trust and connection. Interviewees who did 
not require a rehearsal usually asked me similar questions before their interview, during 
consent taking, or throughout the interview. When interviewees asked me questions, it 
was akin to being interviewed by the interviewees, similar to ‘flipping the mic’ in Chazan 
and Macnab’s (2018) workshop, except that in my case, it occurred much more informally 
and spontaneously. This required self-disclosure and vulnerability on my part. After 
building a stronger rapport and going deeper into the interview, interviewees tended to 
ask me more personal questions related to my mother and our relationship, my education 
and employment background, future plans, and opinions of my generation. 
 
The negotiation of time and role of question asker/responder translated to challenging 
the idea of elders as wisdom-donors (Chazan & Macnab, 2018). If one looked at 
knowledge transmission in a literal and transactional manner, I may be providing 
technological knowledge to some interviewees when they agree to be interviewed. I also 
asked interviewees if they would like to know about the research findings as a way to 
allow room for critique towards my study, and not alienate interviewees from the 
knowledge gathered.  When interviewees asked me questions beyond this research 
frame, especially on my personal background and opinions, we both become wisdom-
donors to each other. It also implied two-way movement of respect and interest. Some 
interviewees, after knowing about my education and past employment history, even 
explicitly asked me for certain advices on ageing. While I sought to downplay these social 
statuses and refused to take on the role of knower, I maintained affirmative relationship 
throughout interaction with interviewees. Apart from using self-disclosure to affirm 
interviewees when needed, I shared experiences and knowledge disclosed by other 
interviewees, while maintaining confidentiality. This was because some interviewees 
shared more common lived experiences between one another compared to me. In 
addition, disclosing shared experiences among interviewees implied that their lived 
experience was not isolated, and affirmed them of their capabilities and ideas of 
emancipation. This created a web of wisdom sharing going in multiple directions among 
interviewees. 
 
Nevertheless, I did not build affirmative or more personal relationship with all 
interviewees. While this methodology has strong potential in building a trustful and 
mutual relationship between me and interviewees while undoing researcher-participant 
power dynamic, it was still important to be mindful of personal boundaries and 
preferences. To assume that interviewees did not have boundaries was imposing and 
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risked reducing them into mere receivers in our interaction. This would assume that I 
have the authority of a knower or giver in the interviewer-interviewee relationship, the 





Interviewees were recruited via snowballing. I used word of mouth, posted notices on my 
social media accounts and mass-sent text messages. Of the organisations which I 
contacted to request support in recruitment, none were accepted as this study was not 
done in collaboration with them.  
 
The participation criteria went through one round of revision during the recruitment phase. 
The initial criteria were (1) Singaporean women born between 1951-70, (2) has married 
at least once, (3) currently have adult child(ren) and (4) personal gross income does not 
exceed 5999 SGD. I used the income as a proxy indicator of one’s education and social 
class. By setting an maximum income limit, I intentionally craved larger space to prioritise 
knowledge coming from ‘average’ Singaporean women from lower and middle social 
economic status socio-economic status (SES). Using data3 from the Singapore Ministry 
of Manpower’s (2020) annual labour force report, I deduced that the 75th percentile gross 
monthly income range of females between aged 50-54, 55-59, 60-64 and 65-69, are 
$5000-5999, $4000-4999, $3000-3999 and $2500-2999 respectively. In order to avoid 
over-excluding potential participants based on their earnings, while still using income as 
an approximating filter, I used $5999 as the maximum earning level as the selection 
criteria. Moreover, income was not a precise proxy for homemakers and retirees as they 
do not have income; hence, able to participate even if they are of higher social class. 
Therefore, I was not preoccupied that the income level will excessively exclude 
knowledge from women of higher SES.  
 
By setting a maximum income limit initially, I was not implying that those of higher 
earnings now do not face issues or have meaningful knowledge to share. Rather, it was 
based on the assumption that they may be more likely to have access to services and 
consumptions that can ease daily living. Furthermore, their social positionings is likely to 
formally and informally add legitimacy to their knowledge and makes their knowledge 
more accessible. This decision was made based on Yeoh’s (2001; p. 464) writing on 
                                                 
3 See Table 32 of Labour Force in Singapore 2019 report: Employed Residents Age Fifteen years and 
over by gross monthly income from work (excluding employer CPF), Age and Sex, June 2019. 
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studying postcolonial cities, urging one to ‘confront the fraught terrain of representation 
and allow multiple claims to discursive authority in the difficult task of making room for 
the subaltern to speak, without either romanticizing or flattening out his or her voice’. 
 
However, during initial recruitment, I noticed that the income bracket brought discomfort 
to women of all class backgrounds. Women whose income level was within the limit 
tended to feel singled out or saw the income limit labelling them as ‘needy’. On the other 
hand, those whose income level exceeded the limit felt dismissed. As such, I removed 
the income criteria and the final participation criteria were: (1) Singaporean women born 
from 1951-70, (2) has married at least once, (3) currently have adult child(ren). 
 
All seven interviewees were Singaporean women aged between 55 and 60 at the time 
of interview. All of them were married, one was in her second marriage. They each had 
with two or three children, who were adults mostly in their 20s. Among the participants, 
six were ethnic Chinese (Cantonese, Fu Chow, Hainanese and Teo Chew), and one 
ethnic Malay (Boyanese). During the interviews, participants’ highest education attained 
included secondary school, diploma, and university degree. One university graduate and 
one secondary school graduate obtained their first master’s degrees when their children 
were older; another diploma holder obtained an additional diploma when she went 
through a career switch. Three interviewees were still working while the others were 
either retired or became a homemaker many years ago.  
 
Using an interview guide that was designed in English and translated to Chinese, I 
conducted semi-structured interviews in either English-Singlish or Mandarin. Duration of 
interviews ranged from 45 minutes to 2 hours 20 minutes.  When setting up interviews, 
interviewees often told me to just address them ‘aunties’. ‘Auntie’ is an everyday and 
colloquial way of addressing middle-aged and/or married women. When the woman is 
of a certain closer social or kin relation, they are commonly addressed with their first 
name or nickname following ‘auntie’. Interviewees often found it a hassle when asked for 
their names during the informed consent process. While some conceded by telling me 
to address them as Ms/Madam (first/last name), there were instances when this came 
across as too formal. As addressing an elder in Singapore by their first name is 
considered impolite, we finally settled on addressing interviewees as Auntie (first name), 
except for one interviewee who was my colleague and we had always been on a first 
name basis.  
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All interviews were audio-recorded. I transcribed English interviews word-for-word in 
English and translated Mandarin interviews into English. It was common for interviewees 
and me to use certain Singlish4 expressions during interviews. I transcribed Singlish 
expressions word-for-word to retain their meanings so as to avoid misinterpreting certain 
local sayings that has no equivalent English expressions. I wrote interview summaries 
for interviews that were not audio-recorded. The audio-recordings were deleted once 
transcriptions were completed and checked. All transcripts have been anonymised and 





As an ethnic Chinese woman with a limited social network of racial minority women and 
my inability to speak Malay and Indian languages, it was challenging for me to recruit 
non-Chinese women. Using video-conferencing to conduct interviews also created a 
class-barrier as potential interviewees may not have the technological resources to 
participate. The global care chain of migrant domestic workers plays an important role in 
providing care and domestic labour in Singapore. As interviewees’ usage of the domestic 
help services were not prevalent, this study was unable to interrogate the 
interrelationship with Singaporean womanhood. Hence, I emphasise that the knowledge 
from this thesis provides a snapshot of the lived experiences of Singaporean women. It 
is not representative as the universal experience of Singaporean women in interviewees’ 
generation.  
  
                                                 
4 Singlish is a form of colloquial English that encompasses elements of other languages such as Malay, 




Using decolonial feminist practices to situate women in Singapore’s growth 
strategy  
 
In this study, I adopted two key practices of feminist decoloniality to centre on 
Singaporean women’s narratives as sites of knowledge for Singapore’s history of 
industrialisation. The following sub-chapters will elaborate concepts that carry potential 
of using women’s narrative to script an alternative history of Singapore that dwells on the 
coloniality of power in Singapore's growth strategy.  
 
 
Rewriting history centring on narratives of the ordinary 
 
Married and middle-aged women, like the interviewees, were often referred as ‘aunties’ 
in Singapore. Aunties embody Singaporean ‘ordinariness’. The presence of aunties is so 
interwoven into the everyday Singapore that there is nothing seemingly spectacular 
about them that demands a second glance. Similar to the portrayal of ‘aunties’ in other 
Anglo-American popular culture, they are figures who are readily available and 
recognisable as a stereotypic embodiment (Sotirin & Ellingson, 2007). While easily 
identified and playing integral roles in society, aunties are frequently side-lined, often on 
the margins, much less being centred on in research.  
 
Gayatri Spivak’s (1999) and Philip Holden (2008) critiqued postcolonial literature’s 
tendency to ignore ordinary unexceptional events. The overlooked ordinariness of 
aunties is akin to Spivak’s (1999) analysis of British writing on widow sacrifice (Sati) 
portrayed woman as an ‘object of slaughter’. The widow, Rani, was deployed when her 
existence was pertinent enough in producing imperial history. She died of natural death 
which was deemed, “in academic sense, uneventful” (Spivak, 1999, p. 238). Spivak 
(1999) chose to dwell on the ordinariness, wanting “to ask what is not considered 
important enough by the hidden parts of the discipline, hidden only because they are too 
well known in their typicality to be of any interest to anyone engaged in the retrieval of 
knowledge.” Spivak’s (1991) critique could be read alongside Mohanty’s (1991, p. 38) 
writing, “Resistance is encoded in the practice of remembering, and of writing. Agency 




By interrogating the ordinary that is hidden by its ordinariness, Spivak (1999) argues that 
it holds strong potential in not only bringing lesson of women’s triumphant but also writing 
hegemonic historical accounts. Interviewees’ domain of home is safe, obscuring the 
conditions and relations of privilege, oppression and exclusion (Sotirin & Ellingson, 2007). 
Therefore, writing about buried historical hegemonies aligns with Holden’s (2008) 
proposition of ‘remembering otherwise’.  
 
Holden’s (2008, p. 351) first proposed approach is to ‘remember otherwise, continually 
questioning the forms of remembrances take, and indeed the desires that underlines 
them’. Remembering otherwise is not just excavating elements erased from Singapore’s 
national narrative. Instead, one must also resist the risk of romanticising the past by 
making simplistic association with the present that one identifies with. One has to face 
the desires underlying their nostalgia for certain histories. By urging writers to not 
romanticise the past, Holden (2008) also echoes Gayatri Spivak’s (1999, p. 209) 
critiques on ‘self-imposed exiles of Eurocentric economic migration’ who falls for the 
temptation of nostalgic investigation of lost roots. I found myself being anxious of 
Spivak’s critique as a Singaporean, whose ancestors were a part of the Chinese diaspora, 
currently conducting this study in Finland.  
 
Holden’s (2008, p. 357) second proposal is to use ‘colonial memories and colonial 
metaphors to disturb the comfort of the present’, it is ‘a confrontation with resolve – and 
an inability to – a changed place in the world’. It aims to decentre ‘post-colonialism’ from 
colonial metropolitan centre and the nation-state (Chua, 2008, p. 239). While Holden’s 
(2008) proposals focused on the writing of postcolonial literary works in Singapore, I 
argue that they carry decolonial feminist potential. This proposed approaches allow room 
to challenge current status quo of knowledge production, shifting geopolitics of whose 
knowledge and history is legitimate and gets to be remembered.  
 
Taking on Spivak’s (1999) and Holden’s (2008) critiques, the act of interviewing 
unsensational and unexceptional women in this study centres the ordinary as sources of 
knowledge. I use their lived experience and knowledge as one alternative remembrance 
of the history of establishing Singapore. I posit that rewriting history using narratives 
centred on ordinary Singaporean women’s everyday experiences could highlight how 




Recognising diversity of Singaporean women’s identity 
 
Secondly, a decolonial feminist analysis requires recognising the diversity of 
Singaporean women and refusing to conflate them into one stagnant and coherent group. 
This meant recognising interviewees as a group of Chandra Mohanty’s (1991) ‘third 
world women’ and Meyda Yeğenoğlu’s (1998) definition of a ‘western subject’. In addition, 
using Gustavo Esteva’s and Madhu Suri Prakash’s (1998; 2014) one-third/two-third 
world concept could allow nuanced understanding of fluidity of interviewees’ social 
positions over their life course.  
 
Mohanty (1991, p. 38) uses ‘third world women’ as an analytical and political category to 
explore intersectional links between histories and struggles of women, especially women 
of colour, existing outside the normative western framework of women. This term entails 
the recognition of diversity among marginalised women, having potential to uncover 
different conditions and diverse lived experiences. Positioning interviewees as third 
world women also necessitate the rejection of universalising white middle-class women 
experience, imposing development indicators to fit women of third world into binary 
parameters of success or problems (Mohanty, 1991).  
 
In the context of this study, majority of the interviewees were ethnic Chinese, belonging 
to the dominant racial group 5 . Some interviewees were highly educated, having 
university degree qualifications, and some had well-paid jobs. Every interviewee 
possessed at least one identity marker that codes them as part of a dominant group. 
This seemingly situated them and the knowledge retrieved from this study closer towards 
‘western’ women. However, these identity markers are based on western development 
indicators commonly used to measure third world women’s success and problems, such 
as literacy rate and birth-rates, which are (Mohanty, 1991). These markers risked erasing 
the nuances between third-world women and what how they make sense of their lives in 
their terms. Using those markers to define interviewees risk erasing their agency and 
engagement with history, merely keeping them frozen in time and space (Mohanty, 1991).  
 
Interviewees belonging to various dominant groups do not negate the potentials of their 
lived experiences as sites to locate power relations and the social positioning of women 
in Singapore. While I acknowledge correlations between demographic categories and 
privilege, it is important to avoid essentialise interviewees experiences based on their 
                                                 
5 Singapore consist of four official racial categories, Chinese, Malay, Indian, Others, commonly known as 
‘CMIO’ in short. 
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identity markers. Intra difference within each identity category can alter one’s access to 
privileges. Interviewees could potentially be the exceptions of their identity groups based 
on the intersections of identities. For example, being a race majority but not having class 
privilege. As such, it is also useful to interrogate Singaporean women considering 
Yeğenoğlu (1998) argument that ‘western’ should not be thought of as uniformed 
essence; rather it is the process of becoming a constitution of identities. For example, 
the type of schools that interviewees attended, and life choices made during certain 
political and historical contexts differentiated women even if they who share similar 
identity markers such as race, gender, marital status and education level.  
 
Using Yeğenoğlu’s (1998) term, interviewees were not ‘western’ based on social identity 
markers, but had potential to become or unbecome a constitution of identities over their 
life course. I consider the social meaning of their identity markers, but centres on their 
individual lived experience.  Interrogating interviewees’ comfort within their lived 
experience in their terms acknowledges the diversity among them. This challenges the 
idea of an assumed identity marker-derived comfort and default social inclusion based 
on one’s belonging to each group of social identity. 
 
Highlighting intra-group difference also aligns with Mohanty’s (1991) critique towards 
writings that assumed ‘third world women’ form a coherent group. As a coherent group, 
women are always seen in opposition to men ‘regardless of religious, economic, familial 
and legal structures’, and those systems are assumed to be constructed by men and the 
population of men and women only exists in exploitative relations (Mohanty, 1991, p. 68). 
Hence, interrogating individual differences between interviewees who share similar 
identity markers can uncover different lived experiences within seemingly coherent social 
conditions. The knowledge can deepen understanding on processes of marginalisation 
and upwards social mobility as Singapore establishes itself. This mode of understanding 
also complements with interrogating the ordinary to understand power relations and 
conditions that lead to social exclusion.  
 
As such, I argue that using Esteva’s and Prakash’s (1998; 2014) category of ‘one-third’ 
and ‘two-third’ allows nuanced understanding of the process that differentiated women 
belonging to similar background and social identity over time. According to Esteva and 
Prakash (2014), one-thirds are preoccupied with sheer survival needs and those on the 
margins of two-thirds are pushed closer into the one-thirds. The two-third marginals 
‘never had real access to the ‘benefits’’ enjoyed by two-third centres who occupied the 
centre of the modern world (Esteva and Prakash, 2014, p. 4). Interviewees’ social 
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position, comfort and privilege can be more accurately represented using ‘one-thirds’ 
and ‘two-thirds’ categories than using social identity markers, such as gender, race or 
income level. After all, identity markers form a non-exhaustive list, and the extent of one’s 
privilege and marginalisation in relations to the society is not a zero-sum game of identity 
markers. Identity markers also do not capture the mobility of one’s social positioning over 
time. Esteva and Prakash’s (1998; 2014) one-third/two-third concept acknowledges 
those on the margins which can reflect intra-group nuances and avoid essentialising 
identity markers. Mohanty (2003) also revisited her construct of ‘western’ versus ‘third-
world’ women and adopted the ‘one-third/two-thirds’ as it ‘incorporates an analysis of 
power and agency’ without being essentialist (Mohanty, 2003, p. 506).  
 
Combining Mohanty’s (1991) and Yeğenoğlu’s (1998) concepts of ‘third world women’ 
and ‘western subject’ with Esteva’s and Prakash’s (1998; 2014) concept of one-thirds 
and two-thirds allows a thorough temporal interrogation of the process of becoming a 
constitution of identities. The nature of knowledge retrieved in this retrospective study is 
temporal. Such knowledge encapsulates changes during the process of establishing 
Singapore. Hence, it is insufficient to contextualise interviewees as either Mohanty’s 
(1991) ‘third-world women’ or Yeğenoğlu’s (1998) ‘western women’ as if they were 
stagnant and coherent. Their social positionings can shift over the course of Singapore’s 
development and throughout their life course. Complementing the use of ‘third world’ and 
‘western’ women as the foundation of this study helps to understand the process and 
fluidity of interviewees social position in Esteva’s and Prakash’s (1998) one-third/two-
third terms. This way of interrogation have potential to demonstrate how process and 
conditions of coloniality differentiated Singaporean women over time, reducing some to 
lesser beings (Lugones, 2010). 
 
 
Construction of Singaporean women’s roles to facilitate Singapore’s growth 
 
The construction of gender discourse in Singapore, predominantly motivated by 
economic growth, can be observed in multiple interlocking spheres – political, education 
and family. Gender discourses operated in each sphere as part of the nation’s economic 
development strategies, but never on the basis of ‘gender’. Gender-neutrality is also 
internalised in everyday middle-class family lives (Teo, 2009). Women have always been 




The construction of Singaporean gender roles in family emerged only towards 
Singapore’s independence. Singapore does not have a long traditional family structure6 
(Kuo & Wong, 1979; Pyle, 1997). Eddie Kuo & Aline Wong (1979) argue that it was only 
in the 1930s when Singapore started having a more stable population compared to the 
early 20th century when the population was largely made up of male migrants with no 
intentions to settle down. The patriarchal family ideology arose in the 1950s when women 
in emerging middle class among the politically active fought for equal rights, joining force 
with a group of middle-cum-upper class British rulers (PuruShotam, 1998). This is a key 
background information to keep in mind when interrogating women’s roles in the 
domestic sphere. It challenges the notion of “Asian values”, perceived as a hardened 
traditional family role, which will be further discussed in the second chapter of findings.  
 
Socialisation of gender roles through girls’ education was more diverse in the 1910s, and 
was streamlined into one dominant discourse during the standardisation public education 
in Singapore in the 1960s (Teoh, 2014; 2018). Only during the rapid industrialisation of 
Singapore in the 1960s, a more systematic and standardised set of women’s roles began 
to emerge through girls’ education and family policy. According to Kho Ee Moi (2004), 
the key focus of girls’ education was to prepare them for the labour force and forming a 
common national identity, as with most developing countries right after their 
independence. Citizenship education in the late 1960s aimed to produce youth who did 
not only excelled academically, but also physically by becoming rugged, active and 
having strong national patriotism, and gained competence to become blue-collared 
workers for the industrial economy (Kho, 2004). While both boys and girls were subjected 
to this same set of citizenship education, there was an emphasis on preparing girls for 
domestic roles (Kho, 2004).  
 
Girls’ domestic role is coded as ‘traditional’ and argued to be imperative for maintaining 
social framework of Singapore by then prime minister, Lee Kwan Yew. However, this 
ideology runs contrary to the emergence of family ‘traditions’ in Singapore historical 
writings since stable formation of family structure was a relatively recent phenomenon 
(PuruShotam,1998). ‘Tradition’ is used strategically by statesmen as a hegemonic tool. 
Singapore’s first prime minister, Lee Kwan Yew, associated Singapore with East Asian 
countries rather than neighbouring Southeast Asian states (Zakaria & Lee, 1994). By 
situating Singapore closely with East Asia, he described the ‘Asian model’ as individuals 
                                                 
6 I write family and gender here in a cis-heteronormative manner as same-sex marriages are still not 
legalised and sex between males is still criminalised under Section 377A of the Penal Code. Section 377a 
of the Penal Code is also colonial remnant. It was enacted in 1938 by the British to police male sex work 
(Radics, 2015; Salehin & Vitis, 2020). 
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existing in the context of their family, and he saw the education of women as a threat to 
family units when educated women are more likely to be financially independent and do 
not need to put up with unhappy marriages (Zakaria & Lee, 1994) 
 
Women’s domestic roles that are described as traditional by statemen was shaped as 
part of ‘Asian values’. Asian values were attributed to Confucian teaching, of Chinese 
origins, but earlier histories of girls’ education in Singapore shows that there is a 
discrepancy is understanding what is traditional and its locality (Teoh, 2014; 2018). 
There was a gap when statesmen selectively labelled certain gendered practices as 
‘traditional’ in Singapore as earlier girls’ education taught different gender roles, not 
uniformed across the country. Hence, the use of ‘tradition’ and ‘traditional’ by statesmen 
in the years of establishing Singapore was a hegemonic tool not based on historical fact. 
 
Jean Pyle (1997) argues that women and their labour, albeit not recognized enough, 
were a critical part of Singapore’s economic development that resulted in economic 
success. This was facilitated through carefully written family and fertility policies since 
1960s. Women play the dual role of wage earners and homemakers, aligning with gender 
hegemonies underlying girls’ education curricula in early years of Singapore’s 
independence (Chan, 2020). The central theme surrounding women’s role in Singapore 
is ‘re-production’ - producing labour and reproducing for the economy. On top of 
producing labour, they are also expected to reproduce for the economy which constitutes 
family duties, entailing caregiving, homemaking and childcare. Women’s position at that 
time was similar to the position of West European women in in 1800s whereby the female 
body was an instrument of reproducing labour and expanding the work force (Federici, 
2004) 
 
The government’s preoccupation with economic development and using the female body 
as a tool to further this aim draws similarities with Chandra Mohanty’s 1990s critique of 
the ‘third world women’ in the eyes of the west. ‘Third world women’ has been illustrated 
in terms surrounding “underdevelopment, oppressive traditions, high illiteracy, rural and 
urban poverty, religious fanaticism, and "overpopulation" of particular Asian, African, 
Middle Eastern, and Latin American countries” (Mohanty, 1991, p. 6). In the beginning 
of establishing Singapore, late 1950s-60s, the framing of women in Singapore matched 
western idea of ‘third world women’. They were marked by low literacy, high birth rates 
and oppressed by traditions.  
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Utilising these western indicators imposed on the third-world depicted a problematic 
state of women in Singapore. This in turn provided the landscape to ‘advance women’s 
rights and welfare as a strategy’ to garner votes. People’s Action Party (PAP), used the 
slogan “one man, one wife” in 1959 by promising to abolish polygamy and equal wages 
(AWARE, 2005). The Women’s Charter was also passed in 1961 as a law served to 
protect women and children. These were followed by activists’ campaigns for women’s 
rights and gender equality.  Nonetheless, the enactment of these policies was not for the 
sake of gender equality or human rights, rather women were auxiliary to the state’s 
conception of a modern nation. 
 
Chan (2020) and Kho (2004) argue that improving girls’ education and women’s 
participation in national development were motivated by economic development goals 
rather than gender equality.  Their argument is obvious in then prime minister, Lee Kwan 
Yew’s (1975) speech at the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) International 
Women’s Year Seminar cum Exhibition. He said, “Industrialisation required women 
workers. This led to the education of women. This subsequently led to demand for 
political equality, the right to vote, equal rights, before and after marriage, in the 
ownership of property.” In the same speech, Lee (1975) also, paradoxically, stressed 
that women could only be independent up to a certain extent as he saw their 
independence as a threat to upholding ‘traditional family relationships’, reflected by 
higher divorce rates and ‘social problems of broken homes for children’ 
 
Lee assumes that women, as long as they are illiterate and do not have financial freedom, 
will be the bearers of traditions and would be submissive to their husbands. It rids of their 
agency and assumes that they form a singular group based on western indicators of 
modernity that codes religiosity, literacy, family-orientation and domesticity as not 
progressive, traditional, ignorant, and backwards (Mohanty, 1984). Moreover, woman’s 
responsibility to ensure family functioning, according to Lee, operates in relations to her 
husband. A divorce implies a break from one’s husband. Hence, a woman’s whose 
existence that is no longer in relations to her husband results in her getting blamed for 
not maintaining a ‘traditional family relationship’. Lee’s contradiction of wanting women 
to become highly educated workers but fearing that they become too independent and 
threaten traditional family structure is based the binaric assumption that when women 
are not ‘third world’, they become modern. Borrowing themes from Lugones’ (2010) and 
Sojourner Truth’s (1851) poem Ain’t I A Women?, the modern woman is western who is 
not a subject of coloniality for she will not be colonised and only lesser beings can be 
colonised. As such, Lee’s narrative fear of Singaporean women’s independence is based 
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on the idea that by becoming modern, Singaporean women cease to be targets of 
subjugation. 
 
The only difference between Mohanty’s (1984; 1991) discussion of third-world women in 
relations to the west and in the context of Singapore was that, those in power who saw 
women as the western term of ‘third world women’ were not western colonisers. Rather, 
they were  British-university-educated local men, influenced by British social democratic 
ideology who formed Singapore’s ruling political party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), 
founded in 1954 (Chua, 2017; p. 6). Hence, using Lugones’s (2010) interpretation of 
Quijano’s (2000) “coloniality of power” is useful in interrogating the subjugation of women 
when their subjugation occurs in relations to the state’s economic growth strategy. 
 
 
Establishing race and citizenship in Singapore through gender 
  
The ideology of women playing a vital role in holding a family together, yet only exists on 
the periphery was symbolic of the state’s hegemonic family unit. The idea of ‘head of 
household’ is still a widely recognised concept in Singapore, used commonly in family 
and social policies. In 1993, then finance minister Richard Hu’s reason for medical 
benefits not extended to female civil servants reinforced the idea the head of household 
is a man’s role, “It is the husband’s responsibility to look after the family’s needs, 
including their medical needs. This is how our society is structured. It would be unwise 
to tamper with this structure” (AWARE, 2001, p. 6). Currently, the Ministry of Social and 
Family Development (MSF) (2020) defined ‘head of the household’ as, 
 
 “the person generally acknowledged as such by other members of the household.  The 
person acknowledged as the head by other members of the household is normally the 
oldest member, the main income earner, the owner-occupier of the house or the person 
who manages the affairs of the household. Where the household comprises a group of 
unrelated persons, the head of household refers to the person who manages the affairs 
of the household, or any person who supplied the information pertaining to other 
members.” 
 
While the Ministry of Social and Family Development’s definition of head of household is 
now explicitly gender-neutral, the gender distribution of head of household in Singapore 
is still disproportionate. Households were headed predominantly by men, with 72.0% 
headed by males in 2019, a gradual and continuous decrease from 83.0% in 1990 (MSF, 
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2020)7.  Based on the gender distribution of head of household, one could safely assume 
that the ‘head of household’ tends to be the father and/or husband. 
 
This concept of ‘head of household’ could be traced to British colonial roots, as a tool for 
producing meanings of gender and race to deny the significance of commonwealth 
citizenship of black people. Black people, according to Mohanty (1991, p. 26), is used as 
a unifying term for colonised people from the third world without privilege of white 
adjacency. Since the 1950s, ‘head of families’ was a concept used in British immigration 
laws to prevent Black commonwealth citizens from entering Britain. This deems the 
commonwealth citizenship held by the black persons as irrelevant, granting them no 
access to the United Kingdom. The 1968 Commonwealth Immigrations Act assumed 
men as the ‘heads of family’ and allowed them to send for their ‘wives’, but not the other 
way around (Mohanty, 1991). This example shows how gendering practices have been 
used to organise citizens. 
 
Singapore’s ‘head of household’ worked similarly to the British immigrations law in the 
producing and organising race and citizenship in Singapore. This is further reinforced by 
patriarchal lineage of one’s nationality, surname, race, assigned ‘mother tongue’ and 
access to community support. Race is defined within the CMIO framework based on the 
four main racial categories: Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others. Mother tongues have 
been reduced, i.e. Chinese dialects have been reduced to ‘Mandarin’, various regional 
‘Malay languages’ reduced to Malay, and Indian languages were reduced to ‘Tamil’. The 
patriarchal lineage of race translates to social markers of citizenship and racial 
multiculturalism (Chua, 1996). It sets boundaries to membership and spatiality of 
different racial group.  
 
For instance, an overseas-born child born to a Singaporean woman did not automatically 
become a Singaporean citizen until 2004 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021). On contrary, 
children of Singaporean fathers inherit Singaporean citizenship. A child also took on their 
father’s race until 2011 when double-barrelled race was allowed in the birth registration 
of a mixed-race child (Tan, 2012). While racial categories have been expanded to 
encompasses both parents’ race, children would still need to select and align themselves 
to a ‘dominant race’, which would inform their opportunities and pathways. For example, 
if one’s dominant race is Chinese, one will learn Mandarin throughout their compulsory 
education. One’s dominant race also directly affects where one lives. The Ethnic 
                                                 
7 There is no additional information on how this data was collected and which household member 
answered the survey. 
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Integration Policy, which is aimed at preventing the formation of ‘ethnic enclaves’, sets a 
quota for each racial group in every block of public housing flat. As such, one’s race 
could affect one’s housing and educational prospects. The race registration of a mixed-
race new-born is thus strategic in organising race in the wider society. 
 
My aim of illustrating connections between Lee’s ideology and Singapore’s construct of 
‘head of household’ to Mohanty’s (1991) critique of British immigration laws is not to 
merely establish the colonial roots in Singapore. Rather, I aim to highlight the adoption 
of colonial strategy, using gender politics to produce race and citizens, by locals who 
were highly educated in the west. 
 
By the 1980s, Singapore was experiencing falling birth rate from anti-natalist policies by 
introducing birth control and family planning in the 1970s (Yap, 2003). This led to policies 
aimed at establishing the Singapore citizen through immigration strategies and local 
reproduction. Following the state’s modest success of attracting non-Singaporean born 
talents, they moved to producing their own talents, resulting in the Graduate Mother’s 
Scheme, introduced in 1983 (Quah, 1984). This scheme was commonly described as a 
response to falling birth rate while women’s education level increases (Fawcett & Khoo, 
1980; Lyons-Lee, 1998). It encouraged graduate females to get married and produce 
intelligent offspring. The eugenicist basis of this scheme sparked the nation’s ‘Great 
Marriage Debate’.  
 
The call for graduate mothers to reproduce while encouraging those who are lower-
income and less educated to limit their family reproduction is “tied to a cultural/racial 
maintenance” (Heng & Devan, 1995). The scheme stemmed from the fear of a 
decreasing proportion of Chinese majority as the group was postponing marriage and 
childbirth at that time, and were also the most highly educated racial group (Wong & 
Yeoh, 2003). This scheme was more than proportionately inaccessible to the Malay 
community due to its significantly lower proportion of university graduates. In 1990, only 
0.6% of Malay Singaporeans were university graduates in contrast to 5.1% and 4.1% of 
Chinese and Indian Singaporeans respectively (Singapore Department of Statistics, 
2002).  
 
Race reproduction at that time needs to be seen against the backdrop of the earlier cold 
war in South East Asia when ‘communism’ was conflated with radical Chinese 
community due to highly mobilised population within Chinese education institutions 
(Chua, 1996). The closure of Nanyang University (Nan tah), the only Chinese-medium 
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university in 1980 meant that Chinese-speaking individuals no longer had the option to 
pursue university education in Singapore. That implies that ethnic Chinese who were 
able to pursue university education at that time were anglophone. Not only was the 
graduate mothers scheme eugenicist, it gatekeeps the reproduction of race in Singapore. 
By taking a pronatalist stance towards university graduate women into having children, 
it incentivised educated anglophone Chinese and Indians to reproduce. Hence, not only 
was a women’s body in Singapore a tool to produce labour and reproducing offspring for 




Findings & Discussion 
 
Chapter 1: Common destiny, differentiated opportunities 
 
This chapter covers the conditions of Singaporean women’s early adulthood during 
Singapore’s industrialisation period. I explored the opportunities and barriers faced by 
interviewees during their life trajectory and how that further subjugate or mitigated their 
subjugation.  
 
To gauge interviewees’ autonomy at that time, I asked them about their aspirations when 
they were young. Interviewees generally felt distant from the idea of ‘aspiration’. They 
stated that they in their young adulthood they were focused on ‘trying to survive’ and did 
not have time to think about what they wanted. Madeline described, “In my generation, 
our fight is for survival, basic needs – to have shelter, a stable income, food on the table.” 
Not only did survival needs dominated interviewees’ priorities at that time, it shaped their 
life trajectories and decision-making processes. Often, the word, ‘aspiration’/ ‘dream’ 
was met with a disconnected blank look during interviews. I rephrased my question and 
asked how they imagined their lives at aged 30, 40, 50, etc. when they were younger. 
‘Younger’ was broadly defined it as the age between 18 to late 20s. It was around the 
time when interviewees have completed secondary school education.  
 
Si Hui: I really don’t have much expectations because our time was like ok go out and 
work… All we care about it we have enough to pay bills, food to eat. Whatever is 
left just put in bank. All we care about it we have enough to pay bills, food to eat. 
Whatever is left just put in [the bank]. 
 
The singularity of interviewees’ preoccupations over survival needs during their early 
adulthood was symbolic of a discursive ‘good life’ in Singapore. The ideal ‘good life’ 
stemmed from a place of poverty and shortage. It was determined by stability and safety 
linked to the fulfilment of material basic needs, i.e. shelter, food and savings for social 
mobility. When Singapore was granted independence, the nation lacked a universal 
sense of identity and destiny among its citizens (Chua, 1996). As such, capitalist 
development and its material promise became the common destiny for Singaporeans. 
‘‘Politics’ was reduced to ‘economics’’, statesmen framed ‘survival’ of the new nation in 
economic terms, embodied by an individual’s ability to ‘make a living’ (Chua, 1996, p. 
53). The discourse of the Singaporean ‘good life’ became the universal destiny for 
Singaporeans, associating material progress to ‘survival’. Besides interviewees’ strong 
 27 
preoccupations over survival and shortages, the resistance against my initial 
participation criteria that included an income limit signalled discomfort towards money 
and material possession. 
 
The Singaporean destiny of ‘survival’ through capitalist goals and participation was 
reflected in the purpose of education and schooling trajectory. Education in Singapore 
was state operated meritocracy underpinned by a hegemonic fairness and equality, as 
tool for upwards social mobility (Chua, 1996). However, the reality of equal opportunity 
for upwards social mobility was not uniformed, and the connotation of equal opportunity 
as long as one works hard was at best an ideal. The following sub-chapters will elaborate 
on barriers that interviewees faced in pursuing a ‘good life’ in terms of their language, 
social class and gender. Some of them experienced multiple marginalisation because of 
a combination of identity markers. Barriers faced form the process that differentiates 
women along social class lines, subjugating some of them over time. The barriers; thus, 
determined whether women’s social positions remained in Esteva and Prakash’s (1998) 




Social class and natal family’s support for education 
 
Generally, interviewees’ natal families were working class and their parents were not 
highly educated. In spite of not being able to help out with their children’s schoolwork, 
interviewees’ parents were supportive and recognised the importance of education as a 
means of upwards social mobility. However, interviewees’ parents, while recognising the 
advantages of higher education, tended to not view it as problematic if their daughters 
did not pursue higher education after secondary level. Due to scarcity of resources, 
parents might be more likely to allocate financial resources for education to sons instead 
of daughters. 
 
Joyce: I ever approached my mother saying that I wanted to go to Australia to take some 
course, and study there and work there. But my mum said no, the money will [be] 
reserved for your brother’s study. 
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Among interviewees whose secondary school results were good enough to qualify for 
higher education, they either proceeded to GCE A level8 at pre-university institutions (i.e., 
two-year ‘junior colleges’ or three-year ‘centralised institutes’) or pursued vocational 
diplomas at polytechnics or private institutions. Majority of interviewees took up diplomas 
rather than GCE A level  based on two key reasons. The first reason being that entry 
standards for diplomas at that time were lower than requirements admitting into junior 
college. The second reason being diploma provided individuals with higher employability 
with work-related skillsets not provided by the theoretical GCE A level qualification. In 
contrast, a GCE A level graduate was required to continue with university education in 
order to be competitive enough for the labour market, thereby increasing the time and 
economic cost to participants who needed to join the labour force as quickly as they 
could. 
 
Jia Xin: I took up [A-level] but I changed to diploma instead. Because I think it’s faster, 
wouldn’t take so long and not so expensive. [A-level] got to go to the university. 
So it cost more. Because if you stop at A-level [without continuing to university], 
a diploma will be better. 
 
For those who were unable to afford or have good enough academic results to continue 
higher education, they joined the labour force. They formed the blue-collar9  workforce 
contributing to the industrial production export driven economy. Education institutions 
then also offered limited types of courses, with more options in technical training to 
produce labour force in the industrial economy. 
 
Madeline: If you are able to study, you will continue to study. If you can’t, then get a job… 
There was also not as much opportunities in the past, or many courses. If you 
failed secondary 4 or didn’t do so well to get onto Pre-U, which is ‘A’ Level, 
you can neither move up nor down. You are stuck right there…there was really 
just so little opportunities… All I thought of was that if I can’t study, then I have 
to find a way to work. Opportunities to go to private school was very limited. I 
also didn’t have money as my family was very poor. 
 
This section illustrated how social class and gender act as determinants behind whether 
and where interviewees continued their education. Even if one’s natal family were 
                                                 
8 GCE A Level is the acronym for General Certificate of Education Advanced Level and students’ result 
determines whether they get a place in university education in Singapore. 
9 ‘Blue-collar’ workers include clerical and sales workers, production and transport operators, cleaners and 
labourers (MOM, 2021). 
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supportive of their education, daughters’ education was not prioritised when there were 
limited resources within the family. Interviewees’ options of education were also 
dependent on their socio-economic situation, and they may have to give up education to 
join the labour force if they did not have the resources to do so. Continuing education 





Interviewees who did not speak English were also in a disadvantaged position. Those 
who attended Chinese vernacular education or had little exposure to English language 
in their everyday lives faced additional barrier in advancing education and accessing 
higher-paying white collar 10  jobs. Not proficient in English doubly oppressed 
interviewees whose family was poor and had little resources to advance their education. 
 
Madeline: Because I was Chinese-educated, the opportunities available for me were 
extremely horrible. There were English-educated people at that time and they 
had a lot more opportunities. Even during interview, English was being used. 
Hence, as Chinese-educated person at that time, people looked down on us. 
Employment opportunities was very limited. At most, you end up as a factory 
worker. Hence, there weren’t really any dreams to talk about as I didn’t even 
dare to dream. 
 
Language affected interviewees’ access to schooling and quality of employment 
opportunities. The ability to speak English translated to better and higher-paying job 
opportunities. Madeline expressed that she ‘hated English so much’ at the time when 
she was unable to find suitable employment. There were separate classes in the 
commercial school attended by Doreen. Madeline’s sense of resistance against English 
and institutional separation of the English and Chinese-educated echoed Teoh’s (2018) 
finding whereby Chinese-educated interviewees in her book mentioned that there were 
a ‘great deal of hostility’ and English and Chinese-educated peers ‘just don’t mix’ (Teoh, 
2018, p. 61). Scholars have noted the marginalisation of Chinese-educated community 
during Singapore’s post-independence decades (Teoh, 2018; Kwok & Teng, 2018). 
According to Roxana Waterson and Kwok Kian-Woon (2012, p. 10-11), this group of 
                                                 
10 ‘White-collar’ workers adopt Ministry of Manpower’s (MOM) (2021) definition of ‘PMET’, referring to 
professional, managers, executives & technicians. 
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‘Chinese educated have had to face the problem of marginalisation, in effect becoming 
a minority within a so-called majority race.’  
 
The plight of Chinese-educated ethnic Chinese demonstrated Yeğenoğlu (1998)’s idea 
of one’s identity is formed by a process that constitute various social identities. 
Determining interviewees’ social positioning solely based on their ethno-racial group was 
insufficient to highlight the language-based marginalisation they face that had obstructed 
their pursuit of better jobs and higher education in Singapore which proletariased them. 
 
Nevertheless, it was not only Chinese-educated individuals who experienced 
marginalisation due to language. Faridah, who attended English schools struggled with 
English language. She did not enjoy any proximity to English in her formative years as 
her family’s main language of communication was Malay. It was through the additional 
effort she put in by repeating a year to retake her GCE A Level examination that she 
managed to pass her English examination, allowing her to attend an English-medium 
university. Likewise, Doreen initiated to transfer herself to English class in commercial 
school to be more exposed to English, so as to gain higher proficiency. Interviewees who 
did not enjoy close proximity to English language had to put in immense amount of effort 
and resilience to gain social and cultural capital, which may be out of the ordinary. 
Instead of joining the blue-collar workforce, like Madeline, which was a common 
phenomenon among students who did not perform well enough to continue education 
beyond secondary school at that time, Doreen and Faridah put in extra effort to remain 
in higher education.  
 
Faridah: At O level, I passed everything, but I flunked English. I failed… so I repeated in 
school… Because I feel that my family background, I don’t speak English you 
see. There’s no English book, material to read at all. Only Malay. So my Malay 
is definitely very good because my mum will just buy those magazine… But I 
don’t have any English books, that’s why my English suffered… English is very 
important to make it easier for you to go through education. 
 
Doreen: In commercial school, they separated us into classed of Chinese-educated and 
English-educated students although both classes were taught in English. They 
taught the same thing in both classes. I studied in the Chinese-educated class 
for a year then I decided to transfer to the English-educated class in my second 
year… It was stressful because when my friends speak, I dared to speak but I 
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know that I am not as articulated, or I don’t know.. I- I took it to stride and saw it 
as learning (laughs) I treated it as practice. 
 
Gaining English proficiency over time helped interviewees, such as Faridah and Doreen, 
who were not anglophone in their formative years, mitigated the linguistical 
marginalisation. With English proficiency, they gained access into higher education and 
the white-collar labour force. The job and education opportunities that came with the 
Doreen and Faridah’s higher English proficiency demonstrated the temporal fluidity of 
marginalisation throughout interviewees’ life course as they gained material possessions 
to move closer to the two-third centre (Esteva & Prakash, 199; 2014). On the other hand, 
Madeline’s social positioning did not change significantly as she was stuck in the blue-
collar labour force. It only changed after she pushed herself through higher education 
taught in English in her middle adulthood, subsequently securing a white-collar job.   
 
 
Gender discrimination in resource-intensive work fields  
 
In the case of women’s access to higher education and certain white-collar labour force, 
the meritocratic notion of equal opportunity and fairness did not apply. Hegemonic 
domestic roles of women acted as a basis for discriminating against women’s access to 
more prestigious fields of study. Although the discourse of women’s role, paradoxically, 
included being in both the labour force and domestic sphere, the discrimination faced by 
interviewees highlighted that they were only welcomed into certain parts of the labour 
force – blue-collar or less resource-intensive white-collar occupations. This was a 
consequence of encouraging girls’ education and labour force participation for the sake 
of advancing Singapore’s economic development, and not for women’s rights and 
gender equality. Nevertheless, interviewees whose job aligned with the state’s economic 
growth strategy or were capable of producing future labour to sustain economic growth 
had more access to gaining job security and material returns.  
 
Institutional gender gatekeeping was rooted in the discourse of women’s reproductive 
duties, which essentialised them as default subjects for reproduction, caregiving and 
homemaking. The discourse of reproduction was mobilised to establish boundaries 
acceptable for women to participate in the white-collared labour force. Institutions used 
Singaporean women’s discursive reproductive roles to gatekeep them from entering 
certain male-dominated fields. Those fields were, scripted as more resource-intensive 
and rigorous; hence unsuitable and wasteful for women who are ‘bounded’ by domestic 
 32 
duties after marriage. Hence, entry into such fields were systematically less accessible 
to women than men. One widely known example is the field of medicine discriminating 
against women in Singapore by having a gender quota at that time (Tan, 2017).  
 
Interviewees also shed light on other fields discriminating against women. Not only did 
institutional gatekeeping played a direct role, women were also penalised for not being 
able to play both paradoxical roles as little support was available for childcare and 
homemaking at that time, forcing them to exit their career prematurely: 
 
Hannah: During my time… there was a particular course that was conducted jointly by 
[name of institutions], called Mechatronics. My result was much better than my 
ex. We applied for the same course, there’s no reason I don’t get it. But he got 
it, I didn’t get it. So, conclusion is because I am female and he is male… [There 
are spaces] reserved for men. And that is kind of a pity [as] we are not given 
the same, similar opportunities and during my time, there is not enough support 
for women who work. It’s extremely tough… Women are expected to work, 
come home and you still [have to] look after the family. There were no other 
avenues for women… You either have career or you have family... It’s very hard 
to have both, very very hard. 
 
Interviewees’ field of work not only illustrated the boundaries of work that was considered 
a norm for women, it also depicted where Singapore was in establishing its economy. 
The choices available for interviewees to either continue education after secondary 
school or join the industrial labour force illustrated Mohanty’s (1991) observation of the 
1960s when western labour markets expanded labour-intensive industries to the third 
world. This led to an industrial labour force that overwhelmingly constituted young third 
world women. In the case of 1970s Singapore, the entrance of multinational capitalism 
drove the national economic growth and required blue-collar manpower in  industrial 
production (Hansson et al., 2020).  
 
In this study, interviewees mostly, although not exclusively, had white-collar jobs 
experiences. They were almost evenly split between working in traditionally female-
dominated professional care work – such as education and social work – and male-
dominated sectors such as engineering and computing. One of them was a blue-collared 
worker who only became a social worker after pursuing higher education in her middle 
adulthood. This phenomenon was reflective of 1980s-90s Singapore economy 
restructured to move into a high-tech industry, specialising in product design, research 
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and development that drove labour demand for more acute engineers (Kho, 2004). As 
the state recognised the need for women to join newer engineering professions in order 
for Singapore to succeed as a ‘world of high-tech industries.’ (Kho, 2004, p. 90). Filling 
needed manpower in the high-tech industry from the 1980s with Singaporean women’s 
labour was similar to earlier times right after Singapore’s independence when women’s 
labour was used to fill the need for blue collar workers to drive the industrial economy.  
 
Three of the interviewees filled demand for highly skilled work in the computing and 
engineering field required in a high-tech driven economy. All of them achieved success 
in their career in terms of acquiring leadership positions, salary and important work 
responsibilities. By being on track to contribute to the nation’s strategy for capitalistic 
development, they received, in return, the materialistic promise to their labour at that 
time. 
 
White collar work that was coded as women’s work, such as teaching, was also in line 
with the national development strategy (Rahayani, 2016). Teaching, as a profession, was 
a form of reproduction as education was key to building a quality labour force. Education 
was a key driver for producing a highly skilled labour force; hence, important in the 
process of establishing Singapore (Kho, 2004). Teachers contributed indirectly to the 
future high-tech economy unlike interviewees already working in the sector as producers 
of labour.  
 
Manpower produced for future economy growth sustains the existing capitalistic 
economy of Singapore. As Singapore’s capitalistic economy was maintained by the 
subjugation of women and upholding race hierarchy, sustaining the economic structure 
would reproduce existing coloniality of power, continuing to subjugate groups that were 
already subjugated as lesser beings (Quijano, 2000; Chua, 2003; Chua,2017). As such, 
teachers’ roles were important as instruments to sustain the economy via reproductive 
activities. The ultimate end product of interviewees’ labour in female-dominated white-
collar work was similarly to ensure Singapore’s economic development. In return, their 
labour ensured material promises.  
 
Overall, Singaporean women’s access to different parts of the labour force was symbolic 
of the different position of Singapore in global capitalism at different time point. Women 
had greater access to blue collar jobs when Singapore was an industrial export country 
in the 1960s and 70s, whereas they had greater access to computing and engineering 
industry to drive Singapore’s high-tech industry in 1980-90s.  
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This chapter presented conditions in which interviewees had to strategically decide their 
education choices based on the likelihood of them securing a good job thereafter to 
‘survive’. They faced barriers in accessing higher education and better jobs if they were 
not proficient in English or did not have skillsets that was aligned with Singapore’s growth 
strategy. These barriers created an army of blue-collar low wage workers among women, 
proletariased by the state’s formation of a multinational corporate capitalism to drive 
economic development (Mohanty, 1991; Offe, 1987 as cited in Chua, 1996).  
 
Even though interviewees’ participation in the white-collar labour force portrayed 
Singapore as a modern state in terms of women’s representation in white-collar labour 
force, there were many barriers to overcome, such as language, social class and gender, 
to obtain to a white-collar job. As such, many other women were limited to blue-collar 
low wage jobs forming the Esteva’s and Prakash’s (1998, 2014) one-third social minority, 
excluded from reaping material returns of Singapore’s economic growth. They were 
degraded into proletariat women in industrial work. Interviewees who overcame the 
barriers could access a place in white-collar labour force and had better chances of 





Chapter 2: Negotiation of roles as mothers and wives 
 
This chapter elaborates on interviewees’ negotiation of reproductive roles, as wives and 
mothers, and providing labour in the workforce. Reproductive duties included domestic 
work and childcare to reproduce the next generation of quality labour force to drive 
Singapore’s economic development. Both roles were seen as vital in nation building  by 
statesmen whereby the producing labour contributed to economic development and 
reproductive duty maintained the overall social fabric of Singapore society (Zakaria & 
Lee, 1994; Kho, 2015).  
 
The maintenance of Singapore’s social fabric was practiced by maintaining dual-parent 
household units headed by a male figure. This potentially extended coloniality of power 
as household structure was key to reproduce race in Singapore (Mohanty, 1991; Chua, 
1996; Quijano, 2000). As one’s race and mother tongue were determined by paternal 
lineage, the social control over household structures had an exponential effect on overall 
race structure in Singapore. Nonetheless, this thesis’s aim was to understand women’s 
lived experience of being instruments to the state’s effort in controlling race and driving 
economic growth. The following subsections explore interviewees’ roles as mothers and 
wives as instruments to state’s strategies to maintain social control. 
 
 
Negotiation of roles as mothers 
 
The paradoxical women’s role of producing labour and reproducing was impossible to 
be achieve on equal levels as many Singaporean women struggled to grasp the diverged 
ends of contradictory policies towards women (Kho, 2015; Quah, 1998; Lazar, 1993). 
Moreover, interviewees mentioned that childcare service infrastructure was lacking at 
that time. They were often strained by infant care since they were not able to send their 
children to childcare services before they turned 18 months old, and infant care services 
was not available at that time. 
  
 
 Class-differentiated childcare arrangement and devaluation and women’s 
labour. Childcare and work arrangements among interviewees were class-differentiated.  
When interviewees’ children were schooling in the 1990-2000s, interviewees could be 
categorised loosely as Esteva and Prakash’s (2014) one-third social minority and two-
third majority. Interviewees’ struggles to balance domestic work and employment also 
depicted an overall devaluation of women’s labour.  
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Firstly, women belonging to the one-third social minority group tended to be the main, 
and often sole, breadwinner of their family. While they did not wear the title of head-of-
household, they played important roles of financially sustaining their households. 
Interviewees were preoccupied with making ends meet to meet their household’s daily 
needs. For example, Doreen furthered her studies which helped with her career 
progression, in part because of her passion in her work, but also as a backup plan if her 
husband loses his income: 
 
Doreen: I like this job and I need the certificate for it. Another reason is that [my 
husband’s] vision is not good. Hence, I cannot not be prepared. What if he 
becomes completely blind? Then I will have to take charge.”  
 
In the increasingly affluent Singapore, one-third women were marked by (1) being the 
key household provider and (2) having little to no access to alternative childcare support. 
As the need for income was urgent, they did not have the option to leave their jobs even 
if they could not find or afford trustworthy care for their children. They were more likely 
to settle for less ideal or no alternative care arrangement by bringing work home and be 
in employment with flexible timings or timings that complemented schooling hours of their 
children. Their lack of options showed that the narrative of choosing between childcare 
and work did not apply to them. Using Doreen’s words, the one-third women played 100% 
of each role, bearing both paid and unpaid labour. 
 
Doreen: At that time, there was no one to take care of the children and there’s no one to 
help, I was a 100% housewife in the day then an insurance agent at night 
because I needed living allowance. The family needed the money. I am a 100% 
housewife in the day, but I also have a side-job… Even if I was a homemaker 
100%, I also hosted international students in my home to get some pocket 
money, we needed some money… 
 
Secondly, informal alternative childcare support from other women were critical in 
reducing working women’s burden of childcare and domestic work. Sources of support 
tended to be older female kins, such as mothers, aunts, and mother-in-laws, or a 
neighbouring female nanny. They were likely to be trusted figures, perceived as capable 
to provide quality care for interviewees’ children. As such, the informal support system 
of female kinship providing childcare and domestic labour played a critical role in 
enabling women to participate in the labour force, contributing to the Singapore economy. 
This support network of female kinship formed the invisible economy where the 
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economic value of care and domestic work was not measured as part of the country’s 
production (Hingorani, 2018; Matthew, 2019). 
 
Faridah: My aunt will come in the morning, because my 3rd child [was] sent to childcare. 
[Both my daughters] were already in school. So [my aunt] just do housework, 
cook for me, once she is done with everything, she goes home. Once I go home, 
I just have to serve dinner for the family, that’s all because the washing and 
ironing all she did. 
 
Nevertheless, kin-based support for domestic duties and childcare was unstable. When 
the person providing support fell sick or failed to provide adequate care for interviewees’ 
children, it disrupted interviewees’ work arrangement significantly, triggering them to quit 
their work. Especially since kins providing support tended to be older women, such as 
interviewees’ mothers, mothers-in-law and aunt, they were more susceptible to age-
related ailments and frailty over time, putting an expiry date to their availability to provide 
support. 
 
The informal support that working women utilised was a common theme among two-third 
social majority women’s negotiation of the paradoxical women’s role. They transferred 
their reproductive roles of childcare to trusted older female kin(s) while continuing paid 
labour.  
 
Often, interviewees who became homemakers departed or deprioritised their paid labour 
after the birth of their youngest child. This phenomenon demonstrated an attempt to 
extend one’s dual responsibility of paid work and domestic labour. For instance, Hannah 
and Si Hui quitted their jobs during their career highs after their youngest child was born. 
Interviewees without any childcare support were usually struggling to perform both 
paradoxical roles simultaneously. Those who had financial resources at that time tended 
to either commit solely to their domestic role, or continue work by finding alternative, less 
ideal childcare arrangement. The availability of (unideal) childcare options did not extend 
to interviewees who were making ends meet, preoccupied with sheer survival like 
Doreen. Interviewees whose family was not in a one-third position to survive, like Hannah 
and Si Hui, were expected to put in 100% in domestic labour while their paid labour was 
deemed secondary, akin to a bonus.  
 
Doreen: [My youngest daughter] needed to be home alone for 3 days a week. She will 
go home on her own after school and I will only be home at around 7 in the 
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evening... I think she was still too young at that time. I shouldn’t have left her 
alone at home. I feel like I let her down in this period… [My neighbour] saw my 
youngest daughter, primary 2 at that time, going home on her own. She had to 
climb the gate outside the door to put her keys in to open it, then climb onto it 
again when she closes it.  
 
Hannah: I had to take no pay leave to be in the hospital [with my child] that whole week. 
And it was so bad because being a department head, it is not… How 
understanding do you want your company to be? I was taking no-pay leave, so 
[that’s] acceptable, but the stress was just too much for me. That was when I 
resigned. Then I became a housewife. That is when my career stopped. 
 
My comparison between one third and two-third world interviewees was by no means a 
reduction of the challenges faced by interviewees in either group. Two-third world women 
were expected to focus solely on domestic labour especially childcare, which was 
apparent in them leaving their work when there was no alternative support for providing 
childcare. My findings aligned with Teo Yeo Yenn’s (2013) argument that the principle 
role of Singapore women was to maintain the non-financial well-being of household. If 
they were highly educated, they were encouraged to continue working while managing 
her household. Their dual role was “shaped by an orientation towards nationalist goals 
of economic development” (Teo, 2013; p. 67).  
 
However, fulfilling both roles without support was impossible, as depicted by Hannah 
and Si Hui quitting their jobs to ensure the non-financial well-being of their household. 
Through their experiences, I posit that women in high-paying jobs were placed in volatile 
employment conditions that limited their pursuit of paid labour. They needed to be 
prepared to leave their jobs to prioritise domestic roles whenever their support system 
broke down. The lack of stable and trustworthy support for childcare further accelerated 
this group of women into giving up their paid work, prematurely ending their career. As 
such, being in paid labour tended to be short-lived and was an illusion of agency among 
two-third world women, who tended to have advanced education qualifications. 
 
Moreover, the decline in economic outlook of the country leading to a pay cuts increased 
the likelihood of disrupting women’s career, especially if they did not have stable 
alternative childcare support. When that happened, they joined the ranks of poor third 
world women in the one-third world or hover around the margins of two-third. When Si 
Hui’s mother suffered health complication unable to provide care for her children 
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anymore, the halving of Si Hui’s salary due to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 sped up 
her becoming of a homemaker. Her halved salary was no longer seen as worthwhile in 
contrast to providing full-time care for her children. In Si Hui’s quote, it was striking that 
while decision-making regarding childcare arrangements were shared between spouses, 
the work fell solely on mothers leaving them to face the consequences. Two-third world 
women giving up paid work demonstrated the devaluation of their paid work as 
secondary, not deemed vital in supporting the family compared to their husband’s work. 
 
Si Hui: [My mother] had [medical condition] in early part of that year… That time was 
also recession… my company made us work half a day, pay was cut half so my 
husband said, forget it, we [will] take care of our own children, let your mum rest. 
That how I end up like that. 
 
Friedrich Engels’s The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (2010), first 
published in 1884, argued that modern industrialisation opens an opportunity for 
liberation of proletarian wives by redistributing their time between the private sphere and 
earning from public production. Engels’s (2010) argument was salient among 
interviewees who had to make ends meet and did not have the option to choose between 
work or domestic responsibilities. They formed a group of proletarian wives, in Engels’s 
term, who had a higher degree of liberation in the capitalistic world compared to the 
bourgeois wife. The proletarian wife’s public participation in labour allowed her to break 
out of the domestic confines.  
 
However, the ‘higher degree of liberation’ that proletarian women acquired by 
participating in the workforce argued by Engels (2010) should not be confused with 
liberation from capitalism and the subjugation of women. Silvia Federici (2004) argued 
that women’s labour was already devalued, and they faced employment restrictions 
which limited them to jobs carrying the lowest status in society. Engels’s (2010) idea 
‘domestic confine’ was grounded on the reduced status of women’s skilled production 
within the domestic sphere, denying women’s domestic work value and significance 
(Federici, 2004). If women’s domestic labour was seen as valuable and as an important 
part of production that provided fair returns for their work, then there is nothing to break 
out from. Federici’s (2004) argument applies to interviewees. Even though Doreen’s 
previous proletarian circumstances allowed her to work, the work that she had access to 
were mostly blue-collar jobs.  
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Doreen: Because I needed living allowance, so I searched for everything, even 
tailoring and such… [I found a job selling] insurance, [which] was the most ideal 
employment at that time. I can be at home in the day, because you only meet 
clients after work.  
 
Similarly, jobs available to middle-aged women outside of the work force were limited to 
jobs of low wage and status. Interviewees’ previous work, education and homemaking 
skills were not considered as valuable experience to access to better forms of 
employment. For instance, Si Hui did not have many employment options other than low-
wage blue collar work even though she used to hold a managerial position overseeing 
major projects before being a homemaker for more than a decade. The restrictions faced 
by skilled middle-aged women accessing labour market outside of low-wage work have 
been so normalised, carrying the notion that they should be satisfied with any kind of 
work, albeit the bare minimum.  
 
Doreen: If [women] had stopped [working] for a very long time, for example they 
have stopped and [want to come] out to work when they are 60… there’s no 
way… I noticed that in the supermarket near me, there’s a lot of these aunties. 
They seem to enjoy their work. Maybe they no longer have to earn a lot now, 
and they enjoy the pleasures of just working. There are 4-hour shifts and they 
seem to be happy doing that.  
 
Si Hui: I am not going to do things like [being] a cashier. I want to do something 
where I can interact with people and be happy with, not something for the sake 
of getting that $50, that’s not what I want to do. Something that I like to do. 
 
The normalisation of middle-aged women satisfied with any employment even if it 
devalued their experiences and knowledge demonstrated Engels’ (2010) seeing 
proletarian women’s in the labour force as breaking free of the confines of domestic 
responsibilities. It failed to acknowledge the fundamental devaluation of women’s 
domestic labour and limiting women to jobs that are low-wage and disrespected. 
 
 
 Singaporean motherhood shaped by meritocratic ideal of social mobility. 
Interviewees’ generation of motherhood was underpinned by a fundamental desire for 
their children to have a ‘better life’. ‘Better life’ for children was built on the Singaporean 
destiny of ‘good life’, having upwards social mobility and access to greater material 
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resources than interviewees (Chua, 1996). The optimal conditions for social mobility 
were grounded on hegemonic notions of fairness and equality carried by the meritocratic 
education system as a tool for upwards social mobility (Chua, 1996).  As such, 
interviewees strived to give their children resources to excel in their academic 
performance. Optimal environment for children to succeed academically were perceived 
as having access to quality childcare or economic stability, ideally both.  
 
Beyond giving birth, reproduction duties of women include ensuring children become 
discursive good citizens who were able to contribute to the country’s economy. 
Interviewees shouldered the burden of ensuring their children become good citizens and 
tended to deprioritise paid work when their children did not perform well in school. When 
children excelled academically, they were assumed to be a good citizen who had 
potential in contributing to the labour force. Hence, if they did not perform well 
academically, they risked becoming a discursive ‘bad’ citizen who was deemed as 
having less potential in future labour force. Chua (1996) also mentioned that children’s 
achievement is one form of material success which forms the anxieties of everyday life 
among many in Singapore. The punishment for being a ‘bad’ citizen would be social 
exclusion from enjoying the material promises of capitalism, which was not the ‘good life’ 
that interviewees hoped for their children.  
 
Afterall, women’s paid work was only deemed secondary to the household, unless they 
are the sole or main breadwinner. Therefore, the burden of ensuring their children’s 
academic performance fell heavily on mothers. Guiding one’s children with their 
schoolwork and ensuring that they succeed academically formed a significant part of 
unpaid domestic labour duties. This was especially so for educated women, as they were 
assumed to have the knowledge to guide their children with their schoolwork.  
 
Si Hui: Because I don’t send [my kids to] tuition, I am the tutor also. Um... I [did] what 
other people [do], give them assessment books to do. Tutor also got to do 
marking and then headache la actually. (Shudders) I think of all these things, I 
don’t want to go through all that. 
 
The phenomenon of women giving up paid work when children were not exceling in their 
academic studies was more pronounced among interviewees who were in two-third 
margins at that time. Their income was not considered to be critical to their households’ 
livelihood, but hiring a tutor was a luxury. As such, they personally took up the role of 
supervising and guiding their children’s learning.  
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Madeline: At that time, my son wasn’t doing well in school, so I thought that something 
is very wrong, and I want to stay at home to watch over him. But when 
someone else is watching over your business, it starts to decline. It got to a 
point where the business is pretty much gone. I failed the business. I lost a lot 
of savings. 
 
On the contrary, two-third centre interviewees could direct the pressure of ensuring 
children academic success to private tuition for their children. Having enough material 
resources to distribute their motherhood roles, they retained agency to continue paid 
work as they did not need to personally help their children in their studies. 
 
Faridah: I go back [from work] at about 6, then have to look [at my] children’s schoolwork, 
this stuff. This part is a bit challenging, but my husband engaged a tutor to help. 
He knows that I cannot teach my children, especially PSLE11 maths. Oh dear, I 
cannot do it… I have the support from my family, and we engaged a tutor to 
help the children with their studies. 
 
Interviewees’ preoccupation with their children’s studies and self-efficacy in helping their 
children with academic work signalled a turn in Singaporean familial roles and economic 
circumstances. As Doreen described, “the previous generation had a tough life being 
busy trying to survive. For us, we are more affluent, but we wished for our children to do 
better academically.” Interviewees’ parents did not have resources and as much 
pressure to help children with their academic work. Through this intergenerational 
difference of parenting, it was clear that interviewees were more educated and had 
attained upwards social mobility compared to their parents’ generation. Interviewees’ 
preoccupation of children’s academic performance, symbolic of upwards mobility, was a 
deviation from earlier preoccupation of survival, symbolising an increased affluence 
among interviewees indicating that Singapore’s economy was more established. 
 
Financial consequences of negotiating motherhood and paid work 
 
Interviewees who stopped work for an extensive period lost financial independence and 
employability over time. Those who used to be in the two-third social majority when 
employed were able to take a step back from income generating activities to prioritise 
domestic labour as they have accumulated independent economic resources. However, 
                                                 
11 PSLE refers to Primary School Leaving Examination that students take to graduate compulsory primary 
education. One’s PSLE result determine the chances that a student have to enrol in different secondary 
schools. 
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The lack of income coupled with diminishing savings by being outside the labour force 
over an extended period of time gradually pushed them towards a financially precarious 
position. They resulted being on the margins of two-third and one-third world.  
 
When interviewees who were not working have depleted their personal accumulation of 
financial resources, they depended on household allowances provided by their husband. 
This consequence aligned with Federici’s (2004) writing on the emergence of 
housewives in the 19th century whereby the sexual division of labour limited women to 
reproductive work; hence, increasing their dependence on men whose command over 
women’s labour increased due to their wages. Household allowance that interviewees 
received was not specifically directed at interviewees’ individual consumption or as a 
compensation for her domestic labour. It was meant for day-to-day living expenses of 
the entire household. Akin to the country’s policies related to girls and women, it was not 
aimed at their well-being and rights, but for the maintenance of the nation. Women only 
benefit through the by-product of the ensuring of the nation’s and household’s well-being. 
 
Si Hui: It was quite tough [to become a housewife], because no income you know, 
suddenly. I cannot buy things as and when I feel like. Then everything is like, just 
cannot buy lor12. Got to think carefully. All my money goes to food that’s all. After 
that time, no clothes, no nothing. 
 
As such, interviewees who were homemakers did not receive any wage from their 
intimate labour. Intimate labour, according to Boris and Parreñas (2010, p. 2) constitute 
a range of activities such as “bodily and household upkeep, personal and family 
maintenance, and sexual contact and liaison.” Examples of intimate labour includes the 
act of physical and emotional closeness, building familiarity, and acquiring knowledge 
about another person through one’s own observation and interaction. Interviews who 
had been homemakers described intimate labour as demanding and labour-intensive. Si 
Hui described her duties as a homemaker as hectic managerial work that required a 
multitude of skills, learning and multitasking.  
 
Si Hui: For us, we can multitask at home. Cook, teach […] I have so many roles at home. 
Morning drive them to work, ok, I wake up very early, prepare breakfast […] I vary 
their breakfast… then send them to school so I drive, rush back, [then] I go 
marketing. I don’t anyhow buy, I see what is good and fresh, what is on [promotion] 
and sometimes I stock them [up]. [After returning home], I hand over the car to 
                                                 
12 ‘Lor’ is a Singlish filler word. In this context, it could be interpreted as a reluctant acceptance. 
 44 
my husband, he drives to work. Then [I] teach my children… we sometimes walk 
back [from school]. I teach them how to take public transport [and] schoolwork, I 
also learn at the same time. Then I cook […] I don’t know how to cook you know? 
My mum didn’t teach me, so I learn along the way. While they are at school, I 
googled how to do this, what can I do? I called up my mum, call up my auntie, 
checked online… Every night, [I] have to train my children to take up a hobby, 
every time [I] got to watch them, see what they are good at… 
 
While valued for their domestic labour, homemakers did not enjoy a high and respected 
social status. Interviewees also experienced differentiated treatment between working 
and being a full-time homemaker. Educated women who became homemakers were 
pitied. This demostrated the devaluation of women’s domestic work; hence, homemaking 
was seen as unskilled and less valued (Federici, 2004). 
 
Hannah: When you are a homemaker, people tend to think that you are some ‘ah 
soh’ 13 .That you are probably not educated and are some dumb woman… 
Whereas when you are working, people tend to think, ok, you must be more… 
There is still that stereotype. 
 
Interviewees who stopped working and became full-time homemakers over extended 
period of time formed Esteva and Prakash’s (2014) definition of the two-third world living 
close to the margins with the one-thirds. While they were not preoccupied with sheer 
survival needs, they did not have real access to benefits enjoyed by non-marginals two-
thirds. Relying on their husband and/or children to maintain their basic livelihood, they 
did not have access to the privilege of household members whom they depend on. Since 
one’s social class in Singapore was represented by overall household income, the 
individual precarity and lack of financial agency among interviewees who did not have 
their own income was made invisible. Their real financial position left them precarious, 
having little control over their own sustenance. They did not possess anything tangible 
of material value of their own.  
 
The privilege of being in the centre of two-third world and having one’s own income 
meant being sheltered from the stress of financial precarity and survival. Two-third centre 
interviewees were socially included as they were likely to have the privilege to pursue 
mainstream capitalistic activities, such as making investments or participating in 
                                                 
13 Ah soh: Hokkien slang for middled-aged women who is lower class and unsophisticated 
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consumerism. Financially independent interviewees were able to be more carefree in 
fulfilling their own desires.  
 
Moreover, interviewees who had their own financial resources were observed to exercise 
more agency in making financial related decisions for the entire family. For example, 
Madeline was the one deciding to downgrade their family’s apartment when the family 
needed money. That was not typical as the Singaporean women’s domain in household 
decision was generally limited to non-financial related matters (Teo, 2013). The different 
levels of decision-making power and emotional weight between two-third marginal and 
centre interviewees were seen in the ways Madeline and Si Hui described control over 
their current lives. Madeline’s emotional lightness and Si Hui’s anxiety illustrated the 
nuances between the two-third centre and two-third marginals. 
 
Madeline: I was blessed that I have a sum of money after selling the house. When I work 
now, it is not about “having to work, otherwise I don’t have money left.” I am 
not at the state. I have my own savings now and continue to work. I am free 
to eat what I like, free to go wherever I want to go. Hence, I think I am quite 
happy. 
 
Si Hui: My eldest [child] recently started to invest in stocks because she has savings 
now… Every time when she says, “oh mummy, I made this money”, I tell her, “you 
don’t tell me because I get very sad, I don’t have any extra cash”… When you 
come to this age, there is no income and you feel a bit useless. (Pause and cries) 
 
Interviewees’ financial independence and security cascaded down to indirect socio-
emotional impacts which will broken down in the following subsections. This section had 
shown how interviewees social position changes based on how they carried out the 
paradoxical duties of Singaporean women. Having kins and material resources to 
distribute domestic duties have been significant in allowing two-third centre women to 
retain their social positionings. Without these resources, it was easy for interviewees to 




 ‘Foreign talent’ and loss of employability. Firstly, interviewees who became 
housewives lost their employability to obtain paid employment that valued their skills and 
experience over time. Interviewees, both two-third centre and marginals, similarly 
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attributed their loss of employability as they aged to migrant expatriate labour, commonly 
known as ‘foreign talents’. I argue that their sentiments stemmed from the 
juxtapositioning of Singaporean women and ‘foreign talent’ in the state’s pronatalist 
narrative. In 1980-1982, the state experimented with attracting non-Singapore born 
talents, or ‘foreign talent’, to join the cabinet and civil service (Quah, 1984). The 
recruitment of ‘foreign talent’ was of a ‘modest success’, as such the state decided to 
look inwards for talents becoming selectively pronatalist (Quah, 1984, p. 197).  
 
‘But these efforts to help Singapore compete in the New Economy will come to nothing 
if we do not have enough Singaporeans!’ exclaimed former prime minister, Goh Chok 
Tong (2000). He was deeply concerned with the low total fertility rate, and urged 
Singaporeans to get married and have children to sustain the labour force and economic 
growth, otherwise the country’s survival would be at stake (Teo, 2013). He 
acknowledged that he has ‘no authority to order you to get married, or to decide how 
many children you should have’, and “will bring in foreigners and new immigrants (Goh, 
2000). ‘They will complement our needs, but they cannot replace us’ (Goh, 2000). Goh 
spoke of bringing ‘foreign talents’ for the sake of the country’s well-being as the 
implication of Singaporeans not producing. Using ‘foreign talents’ as the solution to 
Singapore’s low fertility rate, he situated them next to key people who were responsible 
for reproduction – women. But not just any women, women who were seen as more likely 
to reproduce talents for Singapore’s labour force. Following the eugenicist history of 
Singapore’s reproduction, women targeted to be responsible for reproducing talents for 
the country were well-educated and deemed capable of producing intelligent and 
productive manpower for the future.  
 
As the selective pronatalism of the state population strategy was targeted at educated 
women, especially university graduate, Goh’s speech and the country’s population 
strategy pitted educated women, like interviewees, against ‘foreign talent’ competing for 
citizenship. Rather than nationality status on identity card, I refer ‘citizenship’ to the rights 
and privileges granted to a citizen to access a good and full life. Participating in 
capitalistic activities is also a part of one’s exercise of citizenship as the Singapore 
destiny is grounded on the material promises of capitalist growth (Chua, 
1996).Interviewees took the most direct hit of being juxtapositioned next to ‘foreign 
talents’, being reminded of the expendability of their own citizenship. An immediate 
example of citizenship rights is employment and being able to earn an income for one’s 
living. As such, interviewees who were highly skilled and educated faced looming threats 
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of losing their employments and other citizenship benefits if they could be so easily 
replaced.  
 
Interviewees faced challenges in accessing higher-paying job market that matches their 
skills and experience after being outside the labour force for extended period of time. 
Losing employability caused them to be stuck in a position whereby they were financially 
dependent and insecure. As such, they lost access to utilising employment means to live 
well and fully. On the other hand, ‘foreign talents’ who have gained citizenship have 
access to the employment market. Their employment allowed them to pursue the full life 
that interviewees were no longer able to, leading to interviewees experiencing anxiety 
and resentment. As such, ‘foreign talents’ were perceived by interviewees as a major 
threat to educated Singaporean women’s identity and benefits as citizens. 
 
Si Hui: I did [thought of returning to work], but nobody wants me. Our government wants 
foreign talents (laughs) I am not the only one actually… it’s not easy for me to go 
out and get a good job that is well-paid… [Companies] rather get foreigners; they 
are also younger and cheaper to employ. 
 
Hannah: It is at the expense of the locals… Singapore just ran out of ideas and they just 
start importing people. Import, import import. Now, with the Covid-19, what 
happened?... You find locals, middle-aged out of job. What can they do? 
[Private-hire car drivers.] What else? They can’t do anything more. 
 
However, educated Singaporean women without support for domestic duties were 
caught in a double bind. Even if they continued working, they faced challenges that were 
highly likely to drive them into domestic labour ultimately. Once they begun their 
domestic labour, they lose access to material benefits gained from employment. Over 
time, they were less likely to secure employment that matched their skills and experience; 
hence unable to participate in national capitalistic activities which was key in being a 
Singaporean. As such, a Singaporean woman could not gain full material promise of the 
country’s capitalistic growth. The double bind illustrated how expendable women were 
in establishing and maintaining the country. If they did not reproduce, the state would 
look outside and turn to ‘foreign talents’, an import commodity that filled the gap when 
women did not perform their roles of reproductivity. The effect of utilising women as 
dispensable reproductive resources led to women whose identities as citizens were lost 
or threatened to direct their helplessness and frustration towards ‘cheaper and younger 
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foreign talents’. However, both were ultimately expendable resources to forward the 
country’s economic growth. 
  
 
 Fulfilling role of ‘filial daughter’. Secondly, having financial independence was 
vital in maintaining interviewees’ identity as daughters and extending their relationship 
with their natal family. Contributing financially to one’s parents was a common kinship 
ritual that interviewees desired to perform to fulfil the role of a filial daughter. When 
daughters get married, they are symbolically part of her husband’s family; hence, losing 
symbolic and physical proximity to perform rituals of intimacy towards her natal family. 
One Chinese saying goes, ‘ married daughter is akin to water splashed out (jià chūqù de 
nǚ ér, pō chūqù de shuǐ 嫁出去的女儿, 泼出去的水)’. It refers to a daughter joining her 
husband’s family after marriage and ceased to be a formal member of her natal family 
(Shi, 2009). One is no longer responsible for her natal family as her duties have been 
transferred to her husband’s family as she plays the role of daughter-in-law (Chappell & 
Kusch, 2007). It should be noted that this study did not interview enough participants 
from non-Chinese ethnic groups to understand whether they experience similar 
relationship with their natal families. 
 
According to Yeoh et. al (2013, p. 454), in the context of Vietnamese migrant wives, 
Asian femininity is described as ‘the discursive contours of the meanings of ‘good wife’, 
‘filial daughter’ or ‘dutiful sister’’. Interviewees expressed holding similar values. Acts of 
filial piety typically include provision of intimate care, emotional support, financial and 
material support, and support in activities of daily living (ADLs) (Shi, 2009). It carries 
emotional meanings of care and gratitude to elders, and reciprocating their parents’ effort 
and goodwill for raising interviewees. Filial piety values are also reinforced by Singapore 
family laws and policies that places the responsibility of old age support primarily on 
nuclear family members and children (Rozario & Rosetti 2012; Kang et al., 2013; Thang 
et al., 2021).  
 
As married daughters lost emotional and physical proximity with their natal family, 
financial contribution out of their own pocket became all the more important as it may be 
the most practical and convenient way for daughters to perform intimacy with their natal 
parents while apart. The ritual of contributing to their parents, carried significance of care 
and appreciation; thus, maintaining familial ties between interviewees and their natal 
parent(s), fostering emotional closeness and comfort. None of the interviewees 
perceived filial piety as a form of obligation.  
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Interviewees who were unable to contribute to their parents tended to experience grief 
and regrets. The loss of financial independence prevented interviewees from contributing 
to their natal family; hence, unable to practice kinship rituals of care and gratitude 
especially towards their parents. Hannah was unable to contribute allowance to her 
mother, while the Faridah financially supported her fathers’ medical treatment towards 
his end-of life. They exuded vastly different emotions towards their identity as daughters. 
 
Hannah: We were living on my savings. So I don’t give my mum [money], in fact, my 
mum and my sisters helped out by buying milk powder for me, buying pampers 
for me whenever they come, and that is like every month they supply this for 
me… 
Me: Did you ever feel bad for not contributing to your mum because…  
Hannah: Oh yes. (Starts crying) In fact, my mum is the one supplementing me. So that 
is really (pause) not good. Very bad. (Paused, continues crying) 
 
Faridah: With my pay, I am able to support both my parents… my father just passed 
away 6 months ago. But I am very happy that I really take care of him, even 
though I didn’t physically take care of him, financially, [I gave] all the financial 
support, [providing] the best hospital care I can give [to] him until he passed on. 
 
Therefore, having financial independence was crucial in maintaining interviewees’ 
identity as daughters and cementing their familial ties with their natal family. Even though 
they were not obliged to practice rituals of giving to their parents, it was considered 
important to interviewees personally, and not being able to do so brought about emotions 
of regrets and disappointment towards oneself. 
 
 
 Fear of becoming a burden in old age. The most common preoccupation that 
interviewees had towards ageing and old age was to become a burden, especially to 
their children. Nuclear family members were considered to be the first line of support by 
state policies. In the event that one was unable to be self-sufficient, nuclear family 
members were expected to be the the first to bear responsibility of providing, before 
turning to state resources such as social services (Mehta, 2006). Hence, interviewees 
stressed the importance of being healthy and having sufficient financial resources for 
ageing so that they do not have to seek help from children.  
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Knowing that their children’s generation faced greater stress in with higher cost of living, 
all interviewees wished to be self-reliant. As children will form interviewees’ first line of 
support as state support is the last resort, interviewees, especially those without 
substantial savings, were acutely anxious about falling sick or being in need of financial 
support.  
 
Hannah: Given the situation as it is, it is so expensive and you want your children to still 
support you, that is tough, very tough for the kids. And the kids, if they want to 
start their own family then it is very stressful, extremely stressful.”  
 
 
Interviewees also considered it impossible to age with dignity if they were not financially 
independent since they would be reliant on their children, which was considered 
embarrassing and shameful.  
 
Hannah: When you [don’t] have money, what living are you talking about? You probably 
will not be able to survive. So the most important is that they must have the 
financial means, then if they have the financial means, that is not a problem. 
Without the financial means… you can’t even talk about [dignity]. 
 
Interviewees’ preoccupation and envisioning of old age illustrated the two-third marginal 
and two-third centre difference. Interviewees who have been outside the labour force for 
a long time did not have substantial amount savings for retirement. Hence, they were 
preoccupied with their familial support systems collapsing, especially with their children’s 
resources being thinly spread out. If this support system were to collapse, their daily 
livelihood would be threatened. Preoccupied by survival, two-third marginals were 
concerned about daily ‘life’ while two-third centres were able to think about ‘good life’. 
 
As a result, interviewees outside of the labour force for a long time generally expressed 
more pressing financial-related worries about old age. They tended to have barely any 
savings in their Central Provident Fund (CPF) Basic Retirement Sum14 as they did not 
make any contribution when homemaking. CPF is a compulsory savings scheme in 
preparation for retirement to all employees and their employers contribute to monthly; 
therefore, individuals outside the labour force were not able to make any contributions. 
Interviewees who were homemakers for an extended period of time tended to have so 
                                                 
14 The Basic Retirement Sum provides a “monthly income to support a basic standard of living during 
retirement” through monthly pay-outs when one turns 65 (Central Provident Fund Board (CPF), 2021a) 
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little savings in their CPF account that the amount fell significantly below the minimum 
sum. Hence, they could only receive their monthly pay out when they turn 65. 
Furthermore, their Basic Retirement Sum savings was so little that their monthly pay-out 
would barely supplemented the cost of basic livelihood. According to Teo Yeo Yenn and 
Ng Kok Hoe (2019), an estimated amount of $1379 is needed to maintain a basic 
standard of living. 
 
Si Hui: Every time I think about my CPF I get very sad because there is [a] minimum sum 
[to be met]… As of now, I cannot take out any money even though I have already 
passed 55… my pay-out will be very little [every month] 
 
The Matched Retirement Savings Scheme15 was introduced in 2021 to run for five years 
to help ‘senior Singaporeans who have yet to have the current Basic Retirement Sum 
build their CPF retirement savings for higher monthly pay-outs in retirement’, and 
440 000 individuals were eligible (CPF, 2021b; Tan, 2021). It does so by matching 
family’s contribution up to a maximum amount of $600 per year. While interviewees who 
did not have the minimum Basic Retirement Sum acknowledged that the scheme helped 
them to gain some savings, it was still insufficient to alleviate them from financial 
precarity at old age.  
 
Despite homemakers having close proximity to their nuclear family members, such as 
having close emotional relationship and living together, they did not enjoy the same 
privileges of financial security that their family members had. As receivers of their family’s 
financial support, they did not have full access their family’s material resources. This 
depicted how two-third marginals did not have access to the privileges of the two third 
centre in the context of Singaporean women who left the labour force to provide unpaid 
domestic labour. While interviewees and their family collective form a middle-income 
household, their individual access to material resources were differentiated. Hence, 
household socio-economic status made precarity faced by homemakers invisible. 
 
 
Mitigation of Singaporean wives’ subordinated position 
 
Having one’s own heterosexual marriage and forming a nuclear family with children was 
described as a default life process among interviewees. The naturalistic and normative 
idea of a heterosexual marriage and childbearing carried a discourse that the forming of 
                                                 
15 I was first introduced to this scheme by Si Hui. 
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a family unit would run its course. Nevertheless, there was an unspoken aspect on how 
to pick a suitable partner for oneself. The ‘who’ and ‘how’ to pick a heteronormative 
partner were not so clear in the process of socialising interviewees when they were 
young.  
 
Faridah: I cannot wait to grow up. When I was in primary school, I [asked] why is it so 
long [before I] get to 20years old, to get married... I imagine myself, when I am 
40, I am already settled down with children. That’s why I married young right? 
23. I am married in my 3rd year of [university], at that time I am not really 
ambitious… but I’ve always wanted to start a family. I am always looking forward 
to have my first child after I married. 
 
Interviewees discussed spousal hierarchy and support structure within their marital unit 
during interviews. Heterosexual spousal relation is one form of gender relations. Gender 
relations include different categories of women’s and men’s relations to various social 
phenomena such as the state, division labour and economic systems (Iman, 1997). 
Structured by ideologies, beliefs, practices, property and resource ownership, and so on, 
gender relations permeate the entire society (Iman, 1997; Nkenkana, 2015).  
 
In this study, a differentiated acceptability was observed between husband and wife 
being ‘head of household’ in private and in public. Interviewees tended to implicitly place 
their children’s father as the centre of reference in their family and couple unit as the 
head of household. Interviewees constructed the head of household as dual - being a 
husband and a father. The ideal head of household ensures the material functioning and 
well-being of the household.  By positioning husbands as the head of household, the role 
of wives existed in relation to their husbands and played supporting roles. The expected 
duties of a good wife included managing the non-financial aspect of the household and 
not undermining their husbands (Teo, 2013).  
 
However, the reality of household financial arrangement seldom matched this ideal 
notion of household headed by men. In this study, regardless of being high or low income, 
majority of the interviewees were main or sole breadwinners of the family. Interviewees’ 
academic and career success risked undermining their husband as they potentially 
appeared more capable than him. Hence, interviewees negotiated this mismatched 
gender reality by ensuring that their husbands would not be embarrassed by appearing 
less capable within their couple unit and towards other people. For example, Hannah 
drew a significantly higher salary than her ex-husband. When applying for a credit card, 
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she arranged for him to be named as the main credit cardholder even though she was 
the actual main credit cardholder paying the bills and the reason behind the application 
approval. 
 
Hannah: When we first wanted to have a credit card, his pay was so low that he cannot 
[qualify for it]. Of course, I can, but I will become the main cardholder. I told my 
contact, to put him as the main cardholder instead of me. Yeah, that was kind 
of stupid. I became the supplementary instead. It was approved solely based 
on my occupation and salary.  
 
The positioning of who was the acceptable head of household within each household’s 
private reality and in public demonstrated gender relations in Singapore within a 
heterosexual domestic sphere (Ikan, 1997). It showed an active upholding of men as the 
head of household in public spheres by both interviewee and their husbands. Women’s 
oppression is produced and reproduced through ‘cultural habits’, sustained as activities 
of both sexes (Nkenkana, 2015). As such, the patriarchal positioning of ‘head of 
household’ reproduced gender relations in Singapore that surbordinated women (Heng 
& Devan, 1995; PuruShotam, 1998; Wong & Yeoh, 2003). 
 
 
 Men’s Ego and Asian Values. The stereotype of men as egoistic, which 
interviewees considered to be a traditional masculine trait was critical in upholding men 
as ‘head of household’ in public. Often, interviewees characterised men as ‘egoistic’, and 
used it to reason spousal hierarchy. They were mindful of their husbands feeling 
undermined. The tolerance that interviewees have for their husband’s ego was often 
attributed to ‘Asian tradition/values’ which entails wives to be subservient to their 
husbands. Interviewees frequently described ‘Asian values’ as traditional and backwards. 
Those who were more successful than their husband in status quo, such as being more 
highly educated or who earned more, tended to be even more anxious about their 
husband’s ‘ego’. 
 
Madeline: Men are still very ‘Asian’. Lots of ego, only knows how to earn money and then 
go home. 
 
Faridah: The mentality of the husband is still the traditional mentality. As for me 
sometimes, I have to strike a balance. On one hand, I want this career, but I 
also have to realise that I am also the wife. Sometimes, when I feel like 
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[sticking] out my voice, speaking my mind, but at the same time, I don’t want 
my husband to feel like “oh you think you smarter than me is it?” that sort of 
thing. Remember you are still the wife, so it’s not easy [for] women now, with 
a career, be that ideal wife, it’s not easy.  
 
Then prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, described the ‘Asian model’ as 
individuals existing in the context of their family, and saw financially independent women 
as a threat to family units when they do not need to put up with unhappy marriages 
(Zakaria & Lee, 1994). The discomfort towards power dynamics leaning towards the wife 
within spousal units was observed through Hannah’s initiative to name her ex-husband 
as the main credit cardholder.  
 
The state utilised ‘Asian model’ to position Singapore closer to East Asian values, 
perceived to be more compatible with maintaining social order (Zakaria & Lee, 1994). 
According to Teresa Wong & Brenda Yeoh (2003), ‘Asian Values’ serves to preserve the 
state’s ideal heterosexual relationship of the dual-parent family, as opposed to ‘western 
values’ which was seen as less family-centric. The preservation of social order based on 
the Asian Model required the pursuit of the ideal family through the subordination of 
women, including maintaining the domestic sphere as women’s domain (Wong & Yeoh, 
2003; PuruShotam, 1998; Heng & Devan, 1995).  
 
Interviewees ‘letting’ or normalising husbands as heads-of-household reflected their duty 
to maintain the social fabric.  The maintenance of a hegemonically ideal Singaporean 
family unit was through spousal hierarchy. Together, interviewees’ and their husbands’  
responsibility was to fulfil the Singapore destiny of heterosexual married Singaporean 
couples. Their destiny was to reproduce the ideal family to preserve the Asian Model, 
which was defined by a legal heterosexual marriage with children, sexual division of 
labour, and an expectation that younger family members would support their elders (Teo, 
2013). The ideal traditional family structure is the key fulfilling the universal destiny for 
Singaporean marked by material progress (Chua, 1996). Only through this, married 
couple and their children’s promise of a ‘full life’ is assured. Their citizen rights and 
benefits were affirmed after they fulfilled their  duties of producing the ideal family 
structure, qualifying for subsidised public housing16, and receiving grants and cash gifts 
after they have given birth to a child17. 
                                                 
16 For example, CPF Housing Grants (see https://www.hdb.gov.sg/residential/buying-a-flat/new/schemes-
and-grants/cpf-housing-grants-for-hdb-flats) 




Emotional consequences of subordinated position as wives 
 
Couple’s collective pursuit of the Singapore destiny often overshadowed their individual 
roles and needs. Their parental responsibilities tended to overshadow their individual 
spousal needs and roles. The functioning of each household prioritised the well-being 
and success of children, neglecting marital well-being. As such, interviewees were 
observed to diminish their own needs as wives. Occupied with their duties as mothers 
and being mindful of not overstepping their husbands’ ego are subservient roles played 
by wives to uphold the Asian model ideal family. While yearning for their husband’s 
emotional support, interviewees paradoxically reduced their entitlement to their spouse’s 
emotional support and affection. They tended to feel obliged to be grateful for having 
their living needs met and feel guilty if their overall needs were unfulfilled.  
 
The necessary gratitude towards husbands providing for their wives’ and their children’s 
living needs shows a paternalistic gender relation. The paternal role was to provide for 
the household, whereby the receiver of the married man’s provision, the household, was 
subordinate to him. Hence, they ought to be grateful. Intimacy and socio-emotional 
support from one’s husband was deemed a bonus. Moreover, intimacy and emotional 
expressions were coded as feminine, not a masculine role. Married women with children 
were supposed to continue their duties as mothers and wives, without expecting her 
emotional and social needs to be fulfilled. As such, wives continued to be mindful of their 
husbands’ ego, despite feeling isolated and unsupported, lacking recognition for their 
domestic labour.  
 
Moreover, having different aspirations and goals with their spouses also intensified 
interviewees’ sense of isolation as they were on a different life trajectory from their 
spouses. This was more commonly observed among women who attained greater career 
or education success than their husbands. For example, Madeline’s husband used to 
put her down when she pursued her master’s degree at middle-age. 
 
Madeline: My partner wasn’t supportive. He didn’t encourage me. Because he thought 
that you were already so old, what’s the point of spending so much money [to 
study]? Are you able to earn it back? Is there use for what you study? Will 
anyone employ you? Why study if you already don’t have money? Hence, I 
wouldn’t tell him much about what I want to do because he would give me a 
lot of toxic comments. 
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The discomfort recognising wives as ‘head of households’ reflected the fear of then 
Prime minister, Lee Kwan Yew, who argued that financially independent women threaten 
family structure, thereby destabilising the social fabric of the country (Zakaria & Lee, 
1994). Fixated on the state functioning, his argument was detached from well-being and 
autonomy of women. Couples were imposed by the need to fulfil the gendered 
Singaporean destiny, demanding them to reproduce children for manpower. The 
instrumentality of gender systems in maintaining the Asian Model in Singapore thus 
reduced both the Singaporean women and men to vehicles of social functioning18.  
 
Nonetheless, I argue that the reproductivity of women doubly subjugated women. The 
side-lining of women’s well-being led to interviewees downplaying their yearning for 
emotional support and intimacy from their husband. Interviewees’ sense of entitlement 
towards being cared for was symbolic of women’s position to the state. Women’s 
subordinated position implied that their individual well-being was secondary to upholding 
the Singaporean destiny of capitalistic growth. While playing a key role to state 
imperatives, they were side-lined and treated as expendable.  
 
Nevertheless, describing the realities of interviewees’ relationship focusing as an 
unilinear power relationship is dangerous as it reinforces an essentialist notion of male 
dominance, ego and masculinity. Spousal relationship desired by interviewees, 
described as supportive and reciprocal, were present in some interviewees’ relationships 
with their husband. According to some interviewees, their husbands were sources of 
emotional support and shared domestic duties. Interviewees were more likely to 
embrace playing a supporting role when their husband were more involved in their 
activities who supported them emotionally. This shows mutual spousal support which 
contributed to the well-being of spousal relationship. 
 
Doreen: I will see [my husband] as the head of household. And I am a help maid who 
helps him…It’s not one-way. He helps me too and always encouraged me… He 
is my very good helper, and I am his good helper. He really is. It’s very good. 
 
This section analysed how the Asian model imposed the expectation on wives to 
maintain the household by supporting their husband while their husbands provide for the 
family’s material needs.  Such gender relations reproduced spousal hierarchy by framing 
interviewees’ husbands as the head of household, subordinating interviewees. The 
                                                 
18 This study did not include married men’s lived experience, and I suggest that it will be important for 
future studies to also understand how this pursuit of the Singaporean destiny affected them. 
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mismatch reality of head of household caused tension between spouses as it disrupted 
the normative spousal hierarchy. The Asian Model was the fundamental mechanism to 
maintain gender relation within the intimate sphere to maintain social order in Singapore. 
Because the Asian Model operates on the subordination of women, women with higher 
income and/or education level than their husband were seen as a threat to the state’s 
functioning. As such, interviewees who were actual head of households were more likely 
to self-censor or downplay their roles and capability in public while their husband acted 




Chapter 3: Female-dominated labour as emancipatory and sites of resistance 
 
Up until now, I have written a pessimistic destiny of Singaporean middle-class married 
women and their performance of gender roles. While taking into account of state politics, 
I have also been centring on the state, and its organisation of intimate family and spousal 
unit. The findings, thus far, have been pessimistic precisely because I have seen 
interviewees as mere tools of economic production in relations to the state. I risked 
reducing women into cogs of the economic growth machine, short of their capacity to 
think and exercise any power, merely reproducing another generation of labour force. It 
was not yet a decolonial feminist analysis because interviewees were not seen as the 
centre of reference, but in relations to the nation’s strategy of establishing the economy.  
 
Nevertheless, the earlier chapters of this essay set women’s contexts and illustrated 
nuanced experiences among Singapore middle-class married women. It was necessary 
to bridge us to this chapter where I write about the ordinariness of interviewees’ lives as 
potentials for liberation and resistance. This chapter does not invalidate the earlier two 
chapters and analysis thus far. Rather, the earlier chapters presented the conditions for 
interviewees to operate their resistance, where their resistance stemmed from, what their 
resistance interacted with and its implications.  
 
Overwhelming women’s emancipation goals has used the extent of ‘menisation’, where 
women perform ‘men’s work’, as an indicator of emancipation (Nkenkana, 2015). 
Childcare and domestic work were not seen as freeing in classical social theories. For 
example, Marx and Arendt had framed agency in grandiose manner; work carried out in 
the private and domestic sphere, often by women, were framed as mundane, relegated 
as secondary (McNay, 2016). Western conception of agency is predominantly 
individualised – framed as a ground for individual responsibility, an inward self-
transformation, by taking on a set of prescribed choices – which do not lead to liberation 
at its fundamental level (Lugones, 2005). Earlier western writings of resistance also 
concentrated on grand studies of peasant insurgency and revolution in 1960s- early 70s 
(Abu-Lughod, 1990). As such, resistance that did not fit this image of grand collective 
overthrowing of system, such as small-scale local subversion, did not qualify for earlier 
western ‘criteria’ of emancipation. Early writings of resistance also tend to romanticise 
resistance as human resilience and creativity in refusing to be dominated by systems of 
power without exploring the implications on the conditions of resistance (Abu-lughod, 
1990). Not understanding the conditions will limit understanding the possibilities of 
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thriving and creative activity that resist multiple oppression under different conditions 
(Lugones, 2005). 
 
In this chapter, I interrogated relationship building and labour in female-dominated care 
sector – paid and unpaid, public and intimate – as a decolonial feminist approach to 
uncover interviewees’ resistance. I now move the centre of reference away from the state 
and its strategies, focusing on interviewees and their relationships. Relationships 
covered in this chapter included interviewees’ relationship with their work, children and 
this interview.  
 
 
Generative relationship with children 
 
Interviewees’ relationship and practice of domestic work, particularly with childcare, was 
generative, even though (unpaid) domestic labour have led to their more financially 
precarious situation. None of the interviewees who became full-time homemakers 
regretted caring for their family. Their sense of regret was directed towards the 
consequences they face, being financially precarious and being feeling isolated, not their 
children and their performance of care. Interviewees built meaningful relationships with 
their children through domestic labour and often saw their children as the best thing that 
they ever had. 
 
Si Hui: I enjoy my time, I mean, uh, half half. When I think back yes, happy to be here 
and going through, actually each time I grow, I grow up together with my children 
[at different stages of their life]. Each time when I start with one child, it’s different 
and I start the cycle all over again. I also learnt from them… I love it that they 
come back and talk to me instead of [going] out and [keeping it] to themselves… 
They are quite close to me, in that sense. But of course, my life, on the other 
hand, is like no life. 
 
Children had been forces that led to emancipation of interviewees, for instance, divorcing 
abusive spouses and motivating interviewees to pursue their own success. Often, 
children were the only supporters among interviewees’ kinship network. Instead of 
receiving emotional support from one’s spouse or natal family to pursue actions that 
contributes to their individual well-being, interviewees received it from their children. For 
example, Madeline and Hannah’s children played important roles in making major life 
decision that impacted their personal well-being. 
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Madeline: I think my children are my drive [to complete my master’s degree]. They kept 
telling me that, “you can surely make it.” I told them, “I can’t do it anymore”… 
But they were the ones who kept saying, “you can make it.”… They 
encouraged me… They were my [true] supporter.”  
 
Hannah: Finally [my children said], “mum, if it’s going to make you happier, leave the 
marriage.” … So this is where I got that support. Not from my immediate family, 
but my children… By the time I filed for divorce, my self-confidence was at a 
basement level… it was mainly because my kids encouraged me to do it, so I 
filed for divorce. 
 
The parent-child relationships that carried generative potentials towards interviewees 
were also observed in their children’s peers. Interviewees mentioned that their children’s 
peers recognised their earlier struggles with poverty, and were empathetic towards 
homemakers who were socially excluded and struggled with re-entering the work force. 
By recognising unpaid domestic labour provided by interviewees’ generation, some of 
them were spurred to take on projects to raise social inclusion of homemakers. For 
example, Si Hui’s daughter’s friend, piloted a project aimed at helping middle aged 
Singapore women to return to the labour force.  
 
Si Hui: My daughter’s friend in [university] wanted to do a project, but I don’t know if it’s 
abandoned or not. They wanted to create a group for people like us who gave up 
their jobs to take care of children who lose their skills throughout and come out 
together and do something. And let employers go to them and train them for 
something or help them do something. 
 
Interviewees’ children generation’s concern for the wellbeing of interviewees and 
recognition of their unpaid domestic labour was distinct from the dominant subjugation 
of women as instruments of reproduction and devaluation of their work. Such relationship 
was born out of the relationship between both generations. Younger generation’s 
knowledge on the circumstances that have marginalised some women have mobilised 
actions that attempted to tackle social exclusion of middle-aged women. As such, the 
generative and intergenerational support and relationship symbolises hope for future 




Female-dominated domains as sites of resistance 
 
Maria Lugones (2010) describes coloniality as beyond recognising the colonised being 
made inferior. Rather, it is an ongoing process of seeing the reduction of human to non-
human, rejecting and resisting. The first two chapters presented the reduction of women 
to non-human instruments of reproduction and production of labour. The following sub-
chapters will find out how interviewees resisted against their subjugation within 
oppressive spaces such as sites of female-dominated care labour, motherhood and 
interview for this study. 
 
 
 Women solidarity and recognising human value in female-dominated care 
work. Interviewees who worked or were still working in female-dominated care labour – 
such as teaching and social work – placed importance on life rather than producing 
manpower. This opposed to their reproductive duties of producing discursive good 
citizens to contribute to the economy. They were most concerned with others’ well-being 
and building relationships with their students and clients.  
 
Interviewees were able to be in charge when performing labour of care. They were 
observed to steer gender practices towards centring women’s desires and wellbeing 
through their work. Interviewees’ action in occupations that were aimed at producing a 
quality work force is infrapolitical. Infrapolitics is described as acts, gestures and 
thoughts that seemingly appears unpolitical, goes politically unnoticed and is insignificant 
(Marche, 2012). Often, resistive acts were operated through relationship building, 
between social workers and clients, or between teachers and students. 
 
Madeline, a social worker, worked with female married clients facing marital 
dissatisfaction to centre on their own needs and desires. Working with her clients with 
shared experiences, she gained perspective on her own marriage and life. This social 
worker-client relationship depicted a network of knowledge and support formed between 
middle-aged married women. Forming their own network of knowledge allowed them to 
resist the degradation of women as expendable and secondary instruments of labour. 
Through Madeline’s quote below, resistance was portrayed as ‘moving on’ from one’s 
marriage. ‘Moving on’ did not necessarily refer to marital separation or divorce. Rather, 
‘moving on’ meant not having expectations of getting support from one’s husband in 
pursuing their desires. This implied a recentring of reference point within the couple unit. 
By not expecting support from one’s husband, one prioritised themselves. This mitigated 
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the preoccupation of not fulfilling one’s desire when approval and support from their 
husband was lacking. Madeline and her clients built solidarity from their shared 
experiences by exchanging emotional support and knowledge through the professional 
system of care. This web of shared experiences was also formed during interviews for 
this study when I shared similar experiences between interviewees anonymously. 
Interviewees were keen to know more about other interviewees and if they had similar 
experiences and how did they deal with it. 
 
Madeline: When I counsel couples…the woman is just left there trying to think of ways 
to do something, but she ends up being so tired because she still has to take 
care of the family… I will motivate my female client by telling her to just move 
on and stop having expectations on her partner… That helped me too. I have 
some client who just moved on by her own, and if her partner wants to stay, she 
just let him remain there.  
 
While ‘moving on’ did not refer to marital separation or divorce, Madeline also viewed 
divorce as a transformative way for married women in unsatisfying marital relations to 
liberate oneself. She observed that her clients who centred on their own desires tended 
to want a divorce eventually.  
 
Madeline: I have met a lot of couples where the guy doesn’t want to move on while the 
woman moved on and became very successful. At the end, she felt that she 
doesn’t want such a life and initiated a divorce. But the guy usually can’t 
understand what happened and thought that he is doing his best, and [thought 
that] his wife is never ever satisfied. It’s really like my scenario. When they 
finally decided that enough is enough, and [would] want a divorce to have their 
own life, because you are caught in the marriage like having a Tripitaka´s 
Curse (jǐn gū zhòu 紧箍咒)19 tying you up. I have to have a divorce to get rid 
of this curse.” (Madeline) 
 
In chapter 2, I discussed ‘Asian values’ and then prime minister Lee Kwan Yew’s 
preoccupation with women becoming too independent, risking the destruction of the 
country’s social fabric. Madeline’s observation of her clients aligned with Lee’s worry. 
Nevertheless, Lee’s idea of ‘social fabric’ was maintained by the subjugation of women, 
reducing them from being humans to non-human instruments of (re)production. The 
                                                 
19 In the legend, Journey to the west, the Buddhist Monk, Tang Seng, placed an unremovable cursed hoop 
called the ‘Tripitaka´s Curse (jǐn gū zhòu 紧箍咒)’ on the Monkey King’s head to control him. The hoop 
tightens when the Monkey King disobeys Tang Seng, causing him pain. 
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‘social fabric’ maintained by women’s subjugation meant that women would not benefit 
fully from it, as they were not considered to be humans in the society. Instead, they were 
non-human instruments meant to maintain the society. Hence, the idea of a meritocratic 
and fair pursuit of social mobility and its material promise did not apply to women, and 
was akin to a carrot dangling to sway women into submitting to their subjugation.  
 
Similarly, teachers’ non-priority of students’ academic success opposed to the discourse 
of academic success in the Singapore’s meritocratic education being able to guarantee 
upwards social mobility and material gains. The meritocratic ideology drives the 
reproduction of quality labour force. Academic success of students not interviewees’ top 
priority. They were able to reject the material promise of producing academically 
successful students to prioritise their students’ overall well-being. 
 
 Faridah: To me, my job is to teach and nurture my students, whether people see [what 
I am doing as ineffective or] effective, I don’t care. I will just teach the way I 
know that [makes them] become a better person... Ya, that’s more important so 
to me, if I don’t get the best teaching award, I don’t care. I really don’t care. I 
know in my heart I teach the kids to be a good person and understand the 
subject that they are learning and to guide them in a proper way.”  
 
Faridah’s narrative had shown autonomy in how they carried out their roles as teachers, 
prioritising their students’ growth and character even at the expenses of their material 
returns. Even though female-dominated care work was bound to contribute indirectly 
nation’s development strategy by producing quality labour force, interviewees were not 
merely tools to drive the state’s strategy to develop a robust workforce. They were also 
willing to risk the material promises of their labour to prioritise wellbeing of their students. 
 
 
 Interview as space for resistance. Centring ordinary women – defined by their 
normative marital, child and socioeconomic status – as a knowledge source was resistive 
in nature. Interviewees had remarked that although our conversations felt pleasant and 
easy, it also required them to think. Our conversations reflected a discomfort or out of 
the norm practice from everyday. 
 
Interviewees who expressed their negative emotions, such as sadness, loneliness or 
frustration towards their marriage and spouses tended to feel relieved for being heard, 
but also embarrassed or guilty for expressing those feelings. They were worried about 
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how outsiders might view their husband in a negative or imperfect light. As such, 
interviewees were quick to clarify themselves, without prompt, fearing that I might 
mistake their expressions of emotions and desire for solidarity as complaints about their 
husband. I assured them that I understood that the intentions of telling me about their 
feelings were not to complain about their husbands, to portray them negatively. Afterall, 
the feeling towards one’s marriage and putting one’s husband in a negative light are not 
mutually exclusive.  
 
Discussed in chapter 2, husbands played the role of heads of household which carried 
the connotation that they were main household providers. Interviewees were worried 
about their husbands being perceived as inadequate providers when they discussed 
about their emotional needs being unmet, fearing that might imply that their husbands 
had failed as heads of household. Interviewees’ husband’s image as head of household 
taking priority over interviewees’ individual needs and feelings which led to their anxiety 
reflected the secondary and subservient position of wives in relations to husbands. 
Hence, interviewees focusing on their individual needs and discussing the support that 
they wished to receive from their husband were out of the norm. Interestingly, I noticed 
one interviewee being more vocal about her marital dissatisfaction and frustrations when 
her husband entered the physical space where she occupied during the interview. It was 
almost as if her words were directed at him instead of me.   
 
Interviewees’ discomfort and anxiety ran parallel with Gloria Anzaldua’s (1987) concept 
of ‘intimate terrorism’. whereby the oppressed mestiza20 who reacted in a hostile manner 
towards those who degraded her will then turn into an alien isolated from her culture, 
losing the comfort of belonging (Lugones, 2005). Interviewees’ discomfort could also be 
read as the rage that Lugones (2005) describes as isolating yet transformative. One’s 
reality transforms by being outside of the oppressive reality, but being outside of reality 
also meant being alone and inhabited in one’s self (Lugones, 2005). 
 
Afterall, the mestiza was supposed to make peace with others through her docility and 
servitude, otherwise she risks becoming alien to both her European and indigenous 
culture (Lugones, 2005). Likewise, married Singaporean women were supposed to make 
peace with performing subservient roles of wives who supported and did not undermine 
their husbands. Interviewees’ expressing their emotions about their husbands and 
marital relationships was in itself resistive, allowing their own emotions to take 
precedence.  
                                                 
20 ‘Mestiza’ usually refers to indigenous-European mixed-race descent in Latin America. 
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The rage of the oppressed mestiza was considered as madness because it was out of 
character (Lugones, 2005). Similarly, it was out of character and out of bounds for 
interviewees to express unhappiness, to desire more from their husbands. Interviewees 
risked having their emotions deemed laughable when they expressed that their 
husband’s paternalistic economic maintenance of household was not enough for their 
marriage. Hence, it was easier to stay in the ‘confines of the normal’ because by not 
being angry towards the familiar reality, one continues to be part of the society and 
culture; not risking to become isolated (Anzaldua, 1987, p. 3). Yet, interviewees 
interacted with the discomfort to make space for their own emotions. 
 
By centring on one’s own emotions and lived experience during the interviews, 
interviewees disrupted the comfort that was derived from their self-censorship to not risk 
shaming their husbands. I suggest that their self-censorship was similar Anzaldua’s 
(1987, p.20) ‘intimate terrorism’. ‘Intimate terrorism’ is described as women of colour 
alienated by the dominant white culture and did not feel safe in their own indigenous 
culture, stuck in between and not belonging to either culture; hence, unable to move.  
Adopting Anzaldua’s concept of ‘intimate terrorism’ in this study, women who resisted 
were stuck between being a full person who was not subjugated and the dominant 
discourse where they were supposed to be subservient instruments to the state.  
 
Considering state policies and conditions that had marginalised interviewees at different 
life stages discussed in earlier findings chapters, I argue that the requisites to become a 
full person who will not be subjugated in Singapore did not apply to women. Even though 
race, class and language could mitigate the experiences of women’s subjugation – 
allowing some to become two-third centre women – their womanhood will not fully 
release them from state subjugation. Their subjugation was operated by state policies 
that determined women’s roles and positions. Therefore, Singaporean woman belonged 
to the society when they abided by the dominant gender script, playing their roles in 
subjugated positions. Their belonging brought comfort even though they were reduced 
to a lesser being. If a Singaporean woman opposed to her scripted gender roles, she 
would become a social deviant, thus excluding from other women abiding to the gender 
script. Not performing one’s roles as a Singaporean woman will also not make her a part 
of Singaporean men as she was already at a subservient and subordinated position from 
the beginning. As such, she becomes stuck in neither group, alienated by women and 
despised by men.  
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Not engaging with one’s discomfort of subjugation maintains gender relations at status 
quo. Following status quo provided the subjugated a sense of ease as nothing changes, 
and she remains part of a group. When interviewees talked about their marriage and 
emotions, they moved outside the easy confines of gender norms of being good wives-
submissive-victims. Nevertheless, the act of telling did not make them bad wives-
disobedient-agents either. Resistive acts were not meant to be combative, rather it was 
to disengage to release oneself from subjugation, germinating their ‘resistant self’ 
(Lugones, 2005, p. 92). I read interviewees’ telling as a form of disengagement, the 
space created potentially bringing rest and care. By telling, interviewees were 
unintentionally in resistance, not free of their oppression yet. Being in resistance, they 
were both resisting and oppressed, as in that Lugones’s (2005, p. 90) state of ‘resisting 
<=> oppressing’. Therefore, unintentionally, the interviews served as spaces for 
interviewees to be in resistance. 
 
 
 Resistance through motherhood. Since I was around the same age as most 
interviewees’ children, interviewees sometimes made comparison between me and their 
children, gave me advices and asked me questions. Apart from having a researcher 
interviewer-interviewee relationship, I also possessed an intergenerational relationship 
with interviewees, akin of mother-daughter, ‘girl’-auntie. Similarly, I saw interviewees as 
individuals who could be my mother, my mother’s friend or someone whom she might 
have been if not for certain life choices.  
 
Interviewees’ resistive acts of telling during interviewees were likewise salient in their 
relationship with their children. Interviewees — lovingly, angrily, wearily and optimistically 
— passed down their gendered knowledge to the next generation, while resigning to 
their reality being too late for transformation. Often, their knowledge and lived experience 
were passed down in the form of cautionary tales. They exuded desires for their children, 
especially daughters especially, to be able to thrive and pursue their own desires.  
 
Life advices that interviewees gave were centred on the desires and well-being of their 
daughters. They frequently expressed their wishes for their children to be able to freely 
travel around the world, and daughters to be financially independent to avoid having to 
depend on their spouses. In addition, they advised daughters on how to find a spouse 
who complements their lives, which they themselves did not use receive from their natal 
family. Some advice they have include finding a partner who is of similar education level, 
and one who is supportive and willing to pursue similar goals.  
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Hannah: With the wrong partner, you might as well stay single. Forget it… a golden rule 
I tell my kids, “your partner must make your life better. If your partner does not 
make your life better, don’t have a partner. Stay single. It’s ok, it’s alright. 
Because the main purpose of having a partner, this partner must complement 
your life and make your life better. Makes you a better person, overall makes it 
much better. If your partner is going to give you stress all the time, forget about 
it.” Nobody told me that. 
 
Besides daughters, interviewees such as Faridah were socialising sons to redistribute 
domestic responsibilities with their future spouse and accept their wife’s reproductive 
choices. Even if interviewees saw reproduction as a normative and natural aspect of 
marital life when they were younger, they were now disrupting the notion of reproduction 
as women’s role and a naturalised aspect of marriage. This reflected a deviation from 
the state’s manufactured set of women’s roles that centred on reproductive responsibility. 
Interviewees were transforming gender roles of their children’s generation. For example, 
the reproductive choice of Madeline’s future daughter-in-law was something that 
Madeline and her son did not have a say in. 
 
Faridah: I teach my son to be able to do housework so it [is] not only the women’s job. 
Because now every family is dual-breadwinner, not [just] one. [They] must 
understand each other, try to work things out together. They cannot rely on 
women. [Not anymore]. As I said, whether they can balance or not, depends on 
the upbringing. 
 
Madeline: Most modern women these days rather not have children. I can also accept. 
Even my son’s current girlfriend, future wife, says that she is not keen on having 
children, I said that it is ok. If you can’t, it’s better you don’t harm anyone. [My 
son] asked me if I think that he was continuing the family line, and I said that 
there’s no need to.  
 
Interviewees’ passing down their own knowledge on picking a compatible spouse and 
centring on women as people, was unlike the socialisation and relationship they had with 
their natal family.  Even though interviewees tended to have strong emotional bond with 
their natal family, they may not be adequately supported in their adulthood. 
Retrospectively, interviewees frequently wished for more knowledge from their natal 
family in picking a compatible partner. Picking the wrong partner was also seen as one’s 
mistake to bear alone.  
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Madeline: As for mum, she was like, “that’s your choice, you settle it yourself.” Even if 
you went back to them and complain about this person, that this person is not 
ideal or not supportive, they will say, “that’s your choice, so you have to just 
suck it up”.   
 
Madeline’s mother’s sentiment reflected the Chinese saying, “married daughters being 
akin to splashed water, no longer part of their natal family”. Although some interviewees 
received practical support to continue fulfilling mothering duties, they rarely received 
emotional and social support related to their experiences as wives. They expressed 
needs for emotional support including affirmation of the marital woes faced, support for 
decisions they make, especially decisions that are socially stigmatised such as leaving 
a marriage, and/or saying something that risk embarrassing one’s husband and/or 
themselves, or challenging spousal hierarchy. Hence, interviewees’ advice to their 
children symbolised a generational change in mothering. This could be a one marker of 
a turn in Singaporean family history. Advising children to centre on women’s individual 
desires and well-being was unlike expendable positions of Singaporean women during 
interviewees’ young adulthood.  
 
Nevertheless, the process of socialising their children with a different gender discourse 
carried its dilemmas. Resisting did not stop oppressing immediately for both are not 
opposing dichotomous events. Rather it was a push-pull tension as the one resisting is 
also being oppressed at the same time. While interviewees encouraged their children to 
pick someone of their equal social status and prioritise their own desires, they also 
struggled with the paradoxical role of being a supportive wife. Disrupting normative 
gender relations brought tension to interviewees’ identities as mothers, wives and 
women. For instance, Faridah struggled with giving her daughter appropriate advice on 
maintaining spousal relationship as her identity as a mother and an individual woman 
was in conflict. Each of her identity operated in its own logic in different ‘world of sense’ 
(Lugones, 2005, p. 90). As Lugones (2005, p. 90) writes, “she is multiple as reality is 
multiple.”  
 
Faridah: I am in a dilemma. I just want to say, “Aiya, just say whatever you want to say. 
Don’t care about your husband.” But… I [thought], “oh, am I teaching her the right 
thing?”... “always remember that men have ego, whatever it is, try to be 
diplomatic”… That’s all I can advise my daughter, I cannot just say, “just walk out 
of the marriage.” You cannot say that right, you know?  
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The tensions that interviewees experienced reflected Lugones’s (2005, p. 90) making 
sense of Gloria Anzaldua’s (1987) ‘terrorised self’ whereby one feels the “possibility and 
terror of their resistance”, distinct from being under someone’s control. Anzaldua (1987) 
describes the terrorised self as the often unconscious self-blaming and hating, knowing 
that one is hurting, suspecting and internalising that there is something ‘wrong’ with 
themselves. As such, interviewees were aware of the consequence of resistance is to 
become an alien, not belonging inside or outside of the scripts that told them how to 
perform as Singaporean women (Lugones, 2005). By not being inside or outside, one 
becomes isolated.  
 
I argue that the potential consequence of resistance could alienate them from Singapore 
gender practices and citizenship, while being rejected by dominant feminist 
conversations. In the capitalistic Singapore, the spaces available women to practice 
transformative resistance was narrow as their roles were paradoxical – to be reproduce 
in the domestic sphere and to produce labour for the economy. These roles were in 
opposition to each other in terms of women’s well-being whereby to resist one role was 
to practice the other. Yet both roles ultimately subjugated Singaporean women as 
expendable instruments to drive the Singapore’s economy. As subjected individuals, it 
was frightening to be outside the ordinary even if the system oppressed one into servility 
(Lugones, 2005). Considering the fear faced by the terrorised self, interviewees’ 
resistance was not straightforward and cannot be grand. Inaction is often reduced to 
passivity by the western notion of resistance (Lugones, 2005). According to Lugones 
(2005), not acting does not mean inactivity and one who cannot act can still be active. 
Therefore, women who resisted became stuck and isolated, neither a good Singaporean 
woman nor a legitimate (western) feminist. 
 
Furthermore, interviewees’ resistance tended to exist within the domestic realm of 
motherhood. The domestic space carried the notion of family-orientation and tradition, 
coding interviewees as third-world women (Mohanty, 1984). As such, their resistive acts 
hardly fit into western narratives of third world women which were often limited to the 
language of victimhood and problems  as interviewees were not victims (Mohanty, 1991). 
Resistance taking place in sites coded as ‘third-world’ would not be considered as grand 
or drastic; therefore, excluding Singaporean women from dominant feminist 
conversations and classical social contract theories.  
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The transformative potentials of interviewees’ resistive acts were undeniable. Their acts 
of telling their personal history to me and their children were acts of scripting, disrupting 
geopolitics of knowledge. Interviewees’ dialogue with me and their children, displayed 
the multiplicity of interviewees’ identities and actions, creating new geopolitics of 
knowledge. Their acts of scripting itself excavated events and knowledge of the past and 
attached their meaning to it. By doing so, they disrupted the world of meanings to 
encompass their own possibilities.  Their struggle was a simultaneous resignation to fate 
that they were unable to end their oppression and passing new gender knowledge to 
their children’s generation to resist. Interviewees’ resistance was a ‘creative activity of 
be-ing’ operating in ongoing dehumanisation of the oppressed Lugones’s (2010, p. 754).  
 
Overall, this chapter uncover the forms of interviewees resistance against their 
subjugation and the experiences of being in resistance. Recognising Singaporean 
women’s resistance – especially operating intimately in tension – could aligned them 
with other third world women, providing potential for cross-national solidarity and 
organising against capitalistic oppression (Mohanty, 2003). Understanding the 
systematic exploitation of poor third world women in relations to the construction of state 
and multinational corporate capitalism carries potentials of cross-national feminist 
solidarity (Mohanty, 1991). Only when Singaporean women were able to understand how 
their framing of womanhood came about and how it imprisoned them, can they mobilise 
collectively.  
 
While some interviewees were made ‘poor third world women’ through the process of 
establishing Singapore, marked by economic growth, the mobilisation of cross-nation 
third world women building solidarity was not observed in interviewees’ resistance 
(Mohanty, 1991). Interviewees’ resistance occurred in an intimate silo manner that was 
fraught with tension. They were aware that something was amiss, sometimes 
internalising that there may be something ‘wrong’ with them if they complained. They did 
not have yet the words for the (varying levels of) systematic oppression faced; hence, 
they did not have the potential for cross-nation feminist solidarity yet. As such their 
resistance took place in silo intimately, filled with fear and dilemma like the ‘terrorised 
self’ (Lugones, 2005, p. 90). Nevertheless, this chapter builds new knowledge on 
Singaporean women’s resistance against their systematic subjugation, giving 
possibilities to accumulating more words to mobilise solidarity among other poor third 





In conclusion, this thesis aimed to bring forth narratives of Singaporean women whom 
lived through patriarchal state policies in the 1960s-2000s aimed at establishing 
Singapore’s capitalistic economy. There were no prior studies that centred on the voices 
of ordinary Singaporean women to find out about their lived experiences and 
understanding of state policies that affected them (Heng & Devan, 1995; Pyle, 1997; 
PuruShotam, 1998; Wong & Yeoh, 2003; Kho, 2004). Hence, interviewees in this study 
were positioned as living keepers of history that gave potential for activity, in intimate 
and public spaces. My study interviewed seven participants to find out (1) what were the 
context and factors in Singapore that marginalised of Singaporean women? (2) How did 
Singaporean women negotiate their roles as mothers and wives, and what were the 
consequences faced by them? (3) In what ways did Singaporean women resist 
subjugation? 
 
In the first chapter of findings, I showed the multitude of barriers and opportunities that 
interviewees faced to access higher education and white-collar jobs. Being in different 
conditions making it harder for some of them to achieve the Singapore destiny of material 
success; hence, their social positioning across their life course was fluid. Social 
conditions that became barriers preventing interviewees from accessing higher 
education and better-paying white-collar job includes social economic status of their 
natal family, gender and proficiency in English language. Women who did not face or 
overcame these barriers in their young adulthood were more likely to access better 
paying job markets to acquire material resources to become two-third centre women. 
Those who did not were proletariased, limited to blue-collar job that made them one-third 
women. Moreover, women’s access to employment markets were determined by the 
type of economy Singapore was in. An industrial economy meant more blue-collar jobs 
for women, and an high-tech economy meant more white collar jobs for them. The 
barriers faced by interviewees demonstrated ways in which some of them were made 
one-third by Singapore’s process of establishing the state in multinational capitalism.  
 
In the following chapter, I interrogated interviewees’ negotiation of their roles as mothers 
and wives, and how did the devaluation of women’s labour worsen their consequences 
of role negotiations. Interviewees’ negotiation of their paradoxical roles to produce and 
reproduce labour was class-differentiated. Often, alternative support for childcare and 
domestic labour were provided by older female kins. Interviewees who had alternative 
support could continue working and accumulate material resources. Interviewees in the 
one-third group without childcare support, had to settle for no or inadequate childcare 
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arrangement while they work to make ends meet. On the other hand, the struggle that 
two-third women without childcare support tended to quit their careers prematurely to 
become homemakers.  
 
As such, homemakers lost financial independence and employability over time, unable 
to participate in the Singapore destiny of material success (Chua, 1996). They feel 
threatened by the possibility of losing their citizenship identity benefits, anxious about 
financial precarity at old age and regrets when they could not contribute financially to 
their parents. Although one-third women being able to continue working to earn their own 
income, they were often limited blue-collar proletarian jobs. The circumstances faced by 
one-third working women and two-third homemakers were the result of the devaluation 
of women’s work, whereby they were limited to low-wage jobs or their domestic labour 
were deemed unskilled and not part of production. In addition, the income gap between 
two-third centre interviewees, and one-third and two-third margin interviewees 
symbolised a wider economic inequality within this age group of Singaporean women.  
 
Women who used to be in the two-third centres moving to the one-third margins after 
becoming homemakers had been left behind in Singapore’s economic development.  
The establishing of Singapore was akin to being on a rafting boat ride along the current 
where some two-third women manage to stay on it moved forward, while others had 
fallen into the waters with or without the ability to get back up on the boat. Some were 
holding on tightly to the boat, afraid of falling into the water, not enjoying the boat ride at 
all. Those who were securely on the boat, moved along the current which symbolised 
the two-third centres who were not too preoccupied with the lack of financial 
independence, able to experience the carefreeness of having financial agency. Those 
grabbing tightly to the raft boat with toes almost dipping into the water symbolised 
interviewees who were two-third margins, who were in precarious positions of relying on 
their family members. They may live under the same roof as their two-third centre family 
members, but they did not have the privilege of enjoying any material promises and 
financial independence. They grieved the loss of financial independence and their 
identity as daughters. These emotions and preoccupation were one form of the loss from 
Singapore’s national development. Those who had fallen into the water are the one-
thirds, not enjoying the citizenship privileges and struggling to survive, not adequately 
represented in this study. 
 
The ‘Asian model’ upheld a heterosexual male-led dual-parent household structure 
which reduced Singaporean wives to subservient positions (Wong & Yeoh, 2003; 
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PuruShotam, 1998; Heng & Devan, 1995). Interviewees who were their household’s 
main provider tended to be preoccupied of disrupting this normative male-led household 
structure and were mindful of bringing shame to their husbands. In the process of 
maintaining this gender relation, interviewees prioritised their husband’s emotions and 
images over their own emotional needs, ending up feeling isolated. Nonetheless, some 
interviewees also enjoyed supportive and reciprocal relationships with their husbands. 
 
The positioning of Singaporean women in the household was reflective of their position 
in the Singapore society. They were non-human instruments to maintain household 
functioning, and an instrument to maintain social order in the state. Their needs and well-
being were not considered as part of the family and state’s functioning; therefore, 
normalising their undeserving of support and benefits for their individual needs. 
Therefore, interviewees tended to feel obliged to be grateful towards their husband being 
a provider for the household, and downplayed their individual needs as disrupting order 
in one’s household was akin to disrupting the social fabric of Singapore (Zakaria & Lee, 
1994). 
 
In the final chapter of findings, I shifted my focus on interviewees’ narratives instead of 
analysing their lived experiences in relations to Singapore’s nation building to explore 
potential areas of resistance. Interviewees’ relationship with their children were also 
generative towards interviewees, carrying emancipatory potentials, which was not 
observed in other form of kinships. Interviewees’ also practiced unconscious everyday 
resistance in their relationship with their children, sites of female-dominated care labour, 
and their participation in this study. They accepted that they will not be liberated from 
their subjugation but also act to liberate the next generations from the gender relations 
that subjugated them.  
 
Interviewees constructed webs of knowledge among women with shared experiences of 
subjugation and prioritised the wellbeing and growth of children; instead of, reproducing 
them as quality labour for the future economy. While being subservient and grateful, 
interviewees also recognised their needs and emotions that were sidelined. They 
focused on their own emotions of isolation and dissatisfaction towards their marital 
relationship during the interview provided relief and solidarity, although such acts were 
out of the norm and socially deviant. This demonstrated Lugones’s (2005) understanding 
of resistance as ‘<=>’ where oppression and resistance coexist. Interviewees also 
introduced different gender knowledge to their children that recognised women needs as 
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humans, knowing that it would not change their realities, hoping that their daughters 
would not be subjugated. 
 
Overall, this study approached gender as a binary term, solely focused on married 
women. Nkenkana (2015) notes the need to analyse gender beyond dichotomous 
gender, examining systems and structure that victimised and deprived both men and 
women of their humanity. Future studies could explore how Singaporean men of similar 
profile negotiated and made sense of their gender roles in relations to Singapore’s 
economic and national development in the 1960s-2000s. Understanding the division of 
labour between genders could provide understanding to the production of life and means 
of living which carries potential to end the subjugation of women. Shankara (1997, as 
cited in Nkekana, 2015) argues that the production of life and means of living are 
foundations of gender relations; therefore, eliminating the exploitative gender system is 
necessary to improve the status of women. The understanding of a shared oppression 
by global capitalism could also mobilise solidarity between other social minorities and 




I am extremely thankful towards interviewees who trusted me with their stories, taking 
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